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This issue of CTX brings you several articles that take a critical look at the sub-
ject of leadership in irregular warfare and stability operations, as experienced 
in the cities, towns, and countryside of Afghanistan by a generation of special 
operations officers and military personnel from around the world. In addition 
to these analytical pieces, we offer two articles on entirely different topics from 
some new contributors. Two of our contributors chose to remain anonymous, 
a choice you’ll understand when you read their pieces. We’re happy to publish 
these unattributed articles, because it means that some people with important, 
unorthodox things to say trust CTX as the forum in which to say them. We hope 
the ideas they share inspire some serious conversation among readers, as well.
We begin with a special section, Leadership in Afghanistan: Three Takes. 
To begin, an author who prefers to remain anonymous uses two disastrous 
incidents that befell his unit in Afghanistan in 2010 to discuss the qualities of 
military leadership that he believes are too often missing in operations against 
irregular enemies. His concerns are echoed by LTC Lars Werner, a German 
Army Special Forces officer, who writes about the vital importance of unity 
of command for stability operations—in Afghanistan in particular, but his 
observations will apply anywhere an international coalition is trying to rout an 
indigenous insurgency.
The third article in this section is by LTC Gabor Santa, Hungarian Army, who 
is concerned with leadership at the planning level (also in Afghanistan). The 
SOF training units that LTC Santa observed tended to prefer direct action to 
developing the Afghan provincial response companies that were their respon-
sibility. Not only were the Afghans left out of planning meetings, they weren’t 
given access to the tools and data they needed to function efficiently, nor the 
equipment to operate effectively. (Leadership in counterterrorism/counterin-
surgency operations is a theme that comes up frequently in CTX ’s pages. See, 
for instance, “When the Goldfish Meets the Anaconda: A Modern Fable on 
Unconventional Leadership,” in CTX vol. 3, no. 3.) 
The next article, by Dr. Bibhu Routray and Dr. Shanthie D’Souza, introduces 
readers to the insurgent group known as the Indian Mujahideen (IM), which 
uses bombings throughout India to retaliate for what its leaders perceive to be 
oppression of Muslims. Closely associated with the notorious Lashkar-e-Taiba, 
the IM has kept Indian authorities guessing despite some successes against it. 
Australian freelance journalist Paul Johnstone then interviews Nir Maman, 
founder of the training program known as Israeli Special Forces Krav Maga. 
Johnstone, a former Australian Federal Police agent and soldier himself, details 
Maman’s background in close protection, police work, and martial arts, and 
delves into the differences between what Maman teaches and what most 
martial arts courses are about. 
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The final feature article is a treatise on the ethics of drone warfare, but not, as you might expect, about the ways these 
weapons are used. Instead, LCDR Andrew Ely focuses on the effects on drone pilots of operating far from physical 
danger. The moral code of most military services demands bravery in battle. But what of the pilot who sits hundreds 
or thousands of miles away and participates by remote control? LCDR Ely offers some suggestions for training all 
personnel, not just drone pilots, in how to live up to their moral values when they are unable to take direct action.
The CTAP interview is an excerpt of a conversation Dr. Leo Blanken had with an anonymous Afghan Special Forces 
officer, about the officer’s experience training with U.S. forces. The excerpt, although brief, is surprisingly poignant 
for those of us who come from countries with modern, bureaucratized, well-equipped militaries. This issue’s ethics 
column, by longtime contributor George Lober, asks us to consider the quality of mercy through the prism of two 
appalling, yet rational, decisions made by soldiers in wartime. On what basis, the author asks, do the rest of us decide 
that one death is mercy and another murder?
World War II movie buffs are in for a treat with the review by contributor John Locke, who dives deep into the psy-
chology and iconography of Hollywood war movies made while World War II still raged. Both filmmakers and their 
audiences had no idea how the war was going to end, Locke notes, a fact that lent the movies an emotional realism 
post-war films couldn’t quite reach. Finally, MAJ Matt Spear reviews the book The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire 
in Central Asia. As MAJ Spear notes, not only did that geopolitical contest of the late nineteenth century bequeath to 
the world a tangle of weak nation-states and contested borders, but Western powers are still embroiled there.
You can always find the current and all back issues of CTX at www.globalecco.org/journal. You can also “like” Global 
ECCO on Facebook. Interested in contributing? See the last page of this journal for information on how to submit an 
article for review. Feedback is always welcome, especially since our goal is to keep you up to date on news and events 
that affect the CTFP community. 
ELIZABETH SKINNER
Managing Editor, CTX 
CTXEditor@globalecco.org
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Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is a research fellow at the Institute of 
South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. She is presently 
working on projects relating to transition and prospects for long-term 
stabilization of Afghanistan; the regional dynamics of the Afghan 
insurgency; and India’s security, aid, and foreign policy. Among her 
most recent published works is Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014? 
(Pentagon Press, 2012), and she co-edited Perspectives on South Asian 
Security (World Scientific, 2012) and Saving Afghanistan (Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses, 2009). 
Lieutenant Commander Andrew Ely teaches Moral and Ethical 
Philosophy in the Humanities Department of the U.S. Coast Guard 
Academy. He has served in the Coast Guard for over 18 years, most 
recently as commanding officer of Station New London, Connecticut. 
LCDR Ely also served as platoon officer and chief of nautical science 
at Officer Candidate School, as the school chief of the Chief Warrant 
Officer Professional Development Course, and as the administrative 
officer for the Leadership Development Center. He has an MA in 
philosophy from the University of Connecticut and an MA in Security 
and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College.
Freelance journalist Paul Johnstone has a combined 25 years of 
experience in protective security intelligence and counterterrorism. 
A former federal agent with the Australian Federal Police and with 
service in the Australian Army, Johnstone has been formally recognized 
for outstanding police investigations pertaining to complex fraud and 
war crimes. He has lectured and trained law enforcement, security, 
and military personnel throughout Australia, the People’s Republic 
of China, Afghanistan, and the Pacific Rim and is the founder and 
principal director of Street-Edge Defensive Tactics and consultancy 
firm Defensive Measures International. 
John Locke received a BA in English from the University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley and has published books and articles on a variety 
of topics. In 2006, he started Off-Trail Publications (offtrailpublica-
tions.com), which has produced over 30 books on the history of 
popular fiction. The latest Off-Trail book, The Texas-Siberia Trail, is 
a best-of collection of the authentic adventure fiction of Malcolm 
Wheeler-Nicholson, the founder of DC Comics, home of Superman 
and Batman. Locke helps run the Graduate Writing Center at the 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), and teaches writing to NPS 
students. 
Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray is a Singapore-based security analyst and 
consultant, and a visiting fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict 
Studies, New Delhi. He previously served as a deputy director in 
India’s National Security Council Secretariat. Prior to this, Dr. Routray 
worked at various think tanks, including as the director of the Institute 
for Conflict Management in Assam, India. Dr. Routray has conducted 
extensive fieldwork in India’s northeast, and in the states affected by 
left-wing extremists. His writings have appeared in several interna-
tional publications, including Jane’s Intelligence Review, the Asia Times, 
and the Wall Street Journal. 
Lieutenant Colonel Gabor Santa is a member of the 34th Special 
Forces Battalion, Hungarian Army. In Iraq in 2007, he was the 
assistant team leader of the Hungarian Military Assistant and Liaison 
team, NTM-I. Two of his three deployments to Afghanistan were as a 
member of the Hungarian SOF: in 2008, LTC Santa was a partnering 
officer in the International Security Assistance Force SOF Headquar-
ters, and in 2012, he served as the Hungarian SOF Special Operations 
Task Unit liaison officer. He is currently studying at NPS. 
Major Wesley “Matt” Spear is a United States Army Civil Affairs 
officer with extensive leadership and operational planning experience 
in both field artillery and civil affairs. In addition to three combat 
deployments to Iraq, MAJ Spear has served as a civil-military support 
element (CMSE) team leader in Tajikistan and as a theater CMSE 
commander with U.S. Central Command in multiple countries. He 
received his BA in sociology with minors in criminology and military 
science from Western Kentucky University. He is currently a student 
at NPS.
Lieutenant Colonel Lars Werner is a member of the German Army 
Special Forces (KSK). He joined the German Army in 1994 and 
received his commission in 1997. He served as a paratroop platoon 
leader and successfully passed the selection course for the KSK in 2002, 
where he has since served in several positions. LTC Werner received 
his bachelor’s degree in business management from Munich University 
in 2001 and an MA in Special Operations from NPS in 2013.
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My team overcame two of 
the most significant incidents 
in Norwegian military 
history, in terms of casualties, 
since World War II.
The soft approach in military 
leadership does not diminish 
the ability for real command 
when it comes to combat 
missions and the need for 
dedication and discipline.
Little Norway in Big America: Soft Leadership on the Modern 
Battlefield
Anonymous
He has shown calmness and ability to motivate that is rarely seen 
in the Norwegian Armed Forces today. He has solved missions and 
taken care of his men in an exceptionally good way.1
I would like to tell my story, primarily about my deployment to 
Afghanistan in 2010 as a team leader for a military observation team (MOT) 
in Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Meymaneh, and use it to draw some 
personal leadership lessons. Since I received the citation quoted above, it has 
inspired me to excel in my studies and practice of military leadership in the 
Royal Norwegian Navy. In addition, it has impelled me to strive to articulate 
my leadership philosophy. You must judge for yourself whether my experience, 
coming from Little Norway, is applicable to the United States and others, or is 
perhaps too insignificant for the greatest military power in the world. 
The importance of the two episodes I describe is that my team overcame two 
of the most significant incidents in Norwegian military history, in terms 
of casualties, since World War II. Although my experience may look like a 
small step for some of you, it was a giant leap for me, and the lessons I took 
from it, while they might not apply to Big America, certainly apply to Little 
Norway. Maybe some of these lessons have applicability, even if not directly, 
and there may be some food for thought in here, regardless of organizational 
size, legacy, and prevailing attitudes. (To paraphrase Mahatma Gandhi, first 
they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win. 
We’ll see how it goes.)
I will begin by presenting a claim: that soft leadership is the solution to all 
of the issues and challenges arising in the complex and uncertain military 
context of the twenty-first-century battlefield. As to definitions and the 
scope of my claim, I should be more specific. Defining leadership is not at 
all straightforward; the research and literature are immense, and leadership is 
not necessarily the same as command. Nevertheless, the least common ground 
needs to be established; leadership is too important to be governed by “it 
depends,” too many “buts,” and the necessity for situational context. I believe 
that outstanding leadership is reflected primarily among a leader’s followers, 
and the principle of a cohesive team is significant. “Soft” leadership has prox-
imity with the democratic, charismatic, transformational, and servant leader-
ship styles. Soft emotional intelligence and relation cohesion—in contrast to 
mechanical military leadership developed by ancient, albeit great, military 
leaders and based on task cohesion—is on the horizon for future leadership. 
Soft leadership is basically a people-oriented approach. People are the most 
precious resource, and they constitute the social capital of any organization or 
team. The soft approach in military leadership does not diminish the ability for 
real command when it comes to combat missions and the need for dedication 
Faces have been blurred in this article’s photo-
graphs to protect privacy.
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“You got it. It is the most 
experienced team and it’s all 
set. Pick your XO, and report 
back when you want to start 
pre-deployment training.”
The significant other became 
insignificant, and the dog 
got new owners. The Special 
Forces brochures I’d left on 
my dining table beckoned me.
and discipline. Leadership is equal parts art and science; if it were all science, 
we would have undoubtedly won all wars. The art of leadership must be felt, 
experienced, and created. With that concept in mind, here is my story.  
The Call: August 2009
Northern Norway, August 2009. The facial mosquito net was not helping me 
out. I was highly pissed off about being invaded in my personal space by a 
swarm of insects while trying to enhance my military mobility skills on the 
all-terrain vehicle (ATV). Between spitting out and chewing mosquitos, I felt 
my cell phone vibrate with a call that turned out to be from the executive 
officer (XO), Coastal Rangers Command. 
“Hi, Boss. How are you?” I greeted the caller.
“Hi, I have a job for you.”
“Shoot.”
“We’re deploying MOT teams to Afghanistan. Which one do you 
want to command?”
“The second team: March to July.”
“You got it. It’s the most experienced team and it’s all set. Pick 
your XO, and report back when you want to start pre-deployment 
training.”
“Got it. We’ll observe the Christmas break and meet early January. 
By March, we’ll be ready to go.” 
I was excited and honored by the trust shown to me by a unit outside my 
chain of command. The mosquitoes did not bother me anymore. 
Earlier in my career, I had never dreamed of working in the Special Forces 
community. Several years before the call came in, my life had been very 
different: I had 10 years of service in the Navy, I had a significant other, and 
we had a dog. I assumed this lifestyle was irreconcilable with a life outside the 
conventional Navy. The significant other, however, became insignificant, and 
the dog got new owners. The Special Forces brochures I’d left on my dining 
table beckoned me, and I decided that I would excel in SF training. I told 
myself then that I was going to get a new job, and after a year of selection 
and basic training, I had a new job. One and a half years of advanced training 
paid off, and by late 2005, I was an FNG2 headed for Afghanistan, Regional 
Command South.
In 2008, I deployed again, this time as squadron XO. Now, however, I was 
also father to a one-year-old son—I followed him to his first day of preschool 
on the same day I left for Afghanistan. Back in Norway in 2009, my fiancée 
and I squeezed in a wedding, but by January 2010, I was ready to start pre-
deployment training once again, with a new team. I said goodbye to my wife, 
who was expecting our second child, and our little boy. 
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In a small team, I could not 
hold myself superior; I wanted 
to be the leader who could 
be a follower when possible 
and a leader when needed.
I learned a lot from those previous deployments, and I am grateful to be in a 
community that emphasizes the process of turning lessons identified into les-
sons learned. I was determined to utilize my lessons. I had one goal: to build 
the strongest team possible to execute missions on behalf of the Norwegian 
government and its allies. I had a clear vision of what mattered: I wanted to 
start with my men and exemplify how a leader can inspire everyone to take 
action. In a small team, I could not hold myself superior; I wanted to be the 
leader who could be a follower when possible and a leader when needed. I 
wanted to be proactive in taking care of my men. I found it suboptimal to 
solve the missions first and then, only in the aftermath, take care of my men 
if needed; I found it even more difficult to pull the dusty “caring card” from 
some bottom drawer only when the shit hit the fan. 
Caring for my men was, in my opinion, not solely within the welfare do-
main: it was one of the criteria for mission success and something that needed 
my direct attention from day 1. My key to mission success was to “solve” 
my team by emphasizing the importance of communication, commitment, 
and trust. I knew the missions were going to be intricate, I knew it would be 
difficult to measure immediate success, and I knew that independent opera-
tions in rural areas could place collective stress on the team. I needed a team 
that was robust emotionally as well as tactically. I needed my men to be able 
to utilize their full range of will and skills: my job was to provide them with 
opportunity. I worked through my men to crystallize the mission and the 
significance of its purpose; as the facilitator, I put myself in the outer layer of 
the team circle and the men at the center.    
Meymaneh, Faryab Province,  Afghanistan
Our deployment in 2010 turned out to be complex and necessitated adaptive 
leadership. The difficulty of the situation we encountered is hard to depict 
in words. Some of you may recognize some parts of the following story from 
your own experiences, but I will try to bring the events to life through detailed 
descriptions of the background, the context, and what actually happened.
The pre-deployment training went well, and in March 2010, off we went— 
13 pax and a German shepherd—to Afghanistan, Regional Command North, 
for our four-month deployment. We were headed for the Norwegian PRT in 
Meymaneh, Faryab province. As a MOT, our mission was to be the eyes and 
ears of the PRT commander in the three districts of Ghowrmach, Qeysar, 
and Almar. We restated our mission and broke it down into four operational 
pillars: (1) developing sufficient situational awareness (SA), (2) supporting 
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), (3) IED-focused liaising, and 
(4) maintaining a presence in insurgents’ presumed key areas. 
Thanks to the previous team and their willingness to stay in the area of 
operations (AO) for two extra weeks, we had an extensive handover/takeover 
(HOTO). Operating together and gaining an in-depth SA got us off to a good 
start. We incrementally built and expanded our freedom of movement/
freedom of action. The hibernating insurgents were awakening: the IED threat 
was increasing, and the targeting of Norwegian forces was undisguised. In 
April, we were ambushed several times, and IED incidents occurred frequently. 
We took no casualties, but it was a ruthless period for our Afghan friends, 
the ANSF. They lost quite a few of their soldiers and officers. Nevertheless, 
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the mission was successful: we taught the ANSF to respond in a safer manner 
when it came to IEDs. The district governor liked having us there. He would 
say, “You are only 15 men, and you do better than 100 Americans do.” 
2 May 2010: Ambush
At the end of April, the district governor asked us to provide limited support 
for a big, local operation that would take place in the early hours of 2 May, 
in the outskirts of Ghowrmach Bazar, an ancient town in the center of 
Ghowrmach district. This came at the end of a two-week period we had spent 
working in the district. We agreed to provide perimeter protection for the 
couple of hours the governor’s operation lasted, and then we got ready to head 
out on a three-day mission. The national directorate of security, the Afghan 
National Army, the Afghan National Police, and the district governor were all 
pleased by the outcome of the operation.
The operation had taken place on the outskirts of the bazaar in Ghowrmach, 
so when it was over, we took a stroll in the bazaar and bought some naan, 
candies, and soda for the long day ahead, and then departed. We totaled 16 
Norwegian soldiers and two interpreters, distributed in four light-armored 
vehicles and four ATVs; we drove southeast through the valley of Tutak, aiming 
for a layup position in Senjetak Jinab for the following night. Our mission plan 
was to return to previously visited areas, follow up on some earlier initiatives, 
and fill in any gaps that had been brought to our attention by the all-source 
intelligence cell. In the early afternoon, we traveled through a beautiful area— 
a postcard picture of a luxuriant Afghanistan landscape, filled with contrasts:  
a challenging dusty arroyo to navigate in, high wadi walls, small houses sur-
rounded by dense vegetation, huge dunes, and on the horizon, the majestic 
mountaintops still covered in snow. A snapshot from a fairy tale. 
Suddenly, the fairy tale vanished: beauty was routed by the beast. Fifty to 100 
insurgents ambushed us. And they were shooting fish in a barrel.
The attack began around 1400 hours. Due to the relatively unknown terrain 
ahead (we had only seen satellite pictures) and the fact that we were coming 
under heavy fire, we decided to turn back and take another approach route to-
ward Senjetak Jinab: the mission was still in play, despite some minor injuries 
to my soldiers. Until this moment, nothing had caused me to question our 
moving forward with the mission. Nothing had given me any reason to abort 
the mission, or to ask for reinforcements beyond armed overwatch.3 
1610. Man down. GSW (gunshot wound). Paralyzed. Litter patient.
1615. Man down. 43 RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) shrapnel in 
his body. Ambulatory. Kept on fighting.   
1618. Man down. GSW. Entry lower back, exit thorax. Litter patient. 
The mission changed drastically as the attack continued—saving our lives 
became the only pillar of operation in play. We had known that an ambush 
was possible, but we had no forewarning of such a massive attack: 26 RPGs, 
massive close-range small arms fire, three cars on fire, one broken car, nine out 
of 16 Norwegians wounded, four broken and abandoned ATVs. Air support 
dropped no ordnance, only gun strafes and a couple of low passes. 
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Hindsight told us we had been followed and reported, and the insurgents had 
created a plan to disrupt the Norwegians’ operational progress in our own 
backyard. For 16 hours, we struggled for a happy ending amid heavy enemy 
fire. Twelve hours after it was over, we returned to camp with over half of our 
soldiers wounded in action (four were evacuated by helicopter), a shitload 
of equipment left behind, and a team that was happy to be alive. As far as 
we knew, anyway, everyone was still alive. Two soldiers, one of them my XO, 
were strategically evacuated to Norway, their lives hanging by a thin thread. 
In addition, two more had to be replaced due to injuries irreconcilable with 
combat exposure. We had survived, albeit barely, the heaviest casualties in a 
single ambush of Norwegian forces since World War II. 
Despite our damage, the enemy was not able to conquer us. The mission had 
failed, but we had succeeded in saving all of our lives. We started prepping 
for the way ahead. Returning to our base in Meymaneh, I put my original 
standing mission on hold; I shut off my cell phone and put my sources on 
hold for a couple of days as well. The criteria for success needed to be rees-
tablished, and the objective was clear: replace people, get the new ones up 
to speed, and continue our mission on behalf of Norway and its allies. It was 
time to reorganize and reestablish the confidence to carry on: we still had two 
months left of our watch.
I had two avenues of approach to gain motivational momentum again: first, 
reestablish the criteria of success, and second, improve arrangements within 
the team and relations between team members. I used relationship-building 
methods to help the team refocus on the task, all aimed toward the end 
goal: improved combat performance. Our after-action procedures (AAPs) set 
the framework for the next 10 days. In conjunction with the PRT Meymaneh 
commander, I guided and conferred with the International Security Assistance 
Force Joint Command, the military police, the investigation committee, the 
organic crisis support element, the chief of Military Hospital Meymaneh, and 
media officers, and plugged them all seamlessly into our procedures.
Three weeks later, we were back in the theater: four of the wounded men 
were replaced, our equipment was repaired, and a new mission in a new AO 
was on our plate. We all carried the stamp of the previous event, but it was 
a strong and motivated team that was back in business. The new mission 
was stated, and the objectives in Almar province were as follows: (1) initiate 
development projects to improve the security situation, (2) strengthen Afghan 
government influence with the local population, and (3) prepare HOTO for 
the next team taking over at the end of July. 
27 June 2010: IED
My squad commander from previous deployments replaced my injured XO. 
He was my friend and mentor from my days as an FNG, back in 2005. We 
were determined to prevail, true to our operational pillars, and set out on a 
two-day mission in support of the ANSF. The district governor was the face 
of the operation. We brought along representatives from the Afghan Health 
Ministry, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S.-Afghan 
Atmospheric Detachment Team, the U.S. Police Mentoring Team, and the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, as well as a U.S. engineer. We conducted 
successful meetings with local power brokers in both Ghalbala and Khwaja 
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Ghawar. The agenda included facilitating a road construction project and a 
health clinic, along with providing guidance and advice to the local popula-
tion concerning agriculture and water. Papers were signed, and land was 
allocated to future projects. The governor and the rest of us were happy. We 
shook hands all around and headed back to our base, via the governor’s seat 
in Almar Bazar. Only five miles outside the bazaar, we entered an engineered 
gravel road that headed into an Uzbek-dominated area. My driver, the IED 
specialist, was unconcerned, as were the rest of us. 
“IED, IED, IED! Back up, back up, back up!” 
The last vehicle in the convoy activated a 40-pound pressure-plate IED. All 
four men in the vehicle were killed instantly. I sent four of my men and the 
German shepherd to the explosion site. I then located myself 100 yards away 
to gain SA, lead, and allocate our scarce resources. My immediate priorities 
were clear: uphold security and evacuate the dead soldiers. 
Afterward, just like before, I had to pull out my standard operating proce-
dures/guidance for “measures after critical incidents in the field” and my 
AAPs from the ready drawer. I still had to plan for the remaining part of the 
mission: preparing for HOTO. In order to accomplish the mission, I found it 
crucial to focus on my men and lead them by providing purpose, direction, 
and motivation, while handling the loss of four fellow soldiers and preparing 
the next team to take up the challenging baton. 
Once again, the mission had failed, and this time, we had failed in saving 
lives. Our long C-17 journey started: the whole team flew back to Norway 
with the four coffins, all with respective framed pictures affixed. After four 
funerals in Norway, we again returned back downrange with the new team 
to finish our deployment. Once again, the criteria for success needed to be 
reestablished, and the objective was clear: replace people, get them up to 
speed, and continue our mission.
One year after these two events, on 2 May 2011, I got a text message from my 
team members: “…no one could have stopped what happened, but no one 
else could have made the extent of damage so little, and gotten the rest of us 
up stronger than before. Thank you for being such a great role model.”               
Three Principles for Successful Leadership
Have we learned anything useful to help strengthen our teams for completing 
missions and taking care of our men? Can these lessons be utilized without 
being blindly deductive? I believe so. Leadership literature suggests several 
traits and skills necessary to be a successful leader. Whether your model for 
leadership is the 21 irrefutable laws of leadership,4 the study of leadership as 
the warrior’s art,5 the study of masters of irregular warfare,6 or accumulated 
lessons from historical case studies, it needs to be made concrete, applicable, 
and coherent to and interwoven within the respective units and organizational 
culture. Here I’ve categorized my major lessons learned into two ideas: the 
Circle and the Triangle.
The Norwegian creed for leadership is captured in the saying, “Solve your mis-
sion, and take care of your men.” I believe in changing the order of the nouns 
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The Norwegian creed for 
leadership is captured in the 
saying, “Solve your mission, 
and take care of your men.” 
I believe in changing the 
order of the nouns and the 
emphasis: “Solve your men, 
and take care of the mission.”
and the emphasis: “Solve your men, and take care of the mission.” The 
Circle (see figure 1) illustrates my concept of leadership, which was 
inspired by Simon Sinek’s Golden Circle.7 In the three concentric rings 
of the circle, I have deliberately placed the three major components of 
leadership—the men, the mission, and the leader—as I believe they 
should relate to each other. I can’t agree with the traditional belief that 
you can have either a relation orientation, which is aimed at gaining 
low turnover and low grievance rates but also results in low perfor-
mance, or task orientation, which is aimed at gaining high performance 
but brings high turnover and high grievance rates. I believe it is possible 
to achieve high performance, low turnover, and low grievance with a 
proactive emphasis on the men who are being led, a clear understanding 
of the mission and its vital importance for the legitimacy of the military 
force, and the leader’s consciousness about his facilitating role.
“Solving my men” does not mean being nice. I do not shy away from 
open, healthy conflicts about any issues. Nice leaders are irresponsible and 
could cause dysfunctional teams. A conflict could be combat mission–related 
and quickly become a life-and-death situation: the caretaking does not take 
priority, but the deliberation about my men deserves my full attention. I do 
not care what you call it. Maybe it is emotional intelligence? Nevertheless, 
in my experience, relation orientation is a huge factor in increasing combat 
performance without compromising the mission. 
As a leader, I “eat last”—yet another inspiring concept from Simon Sinek.8 In 
his latest book, Sinek concludes: “Great leaders sacrifice their own comfort—
even their own survival—for the good of those in their care.” Furthermore, 
“When it matters most, leaders who are willing to eat last are rewarded with 
deeply loyal colleagues who will stop at nothing to advance their leader’s 
vision and their organization’s interests.”9 
My leadership triangle (see figure 2) identifies three overarching prin-
ciples: communication, commitment, and trust (CCT). All three of these 
principles are concerned with relation cohesion and are a prerequisite for task 
cohesion. I believe that understanding CCT, and deliberately using the CCT 
principles as building blocks for team building, is crucial to avoiding dysfunc-
tional teams. Communication needs to be open, clear, and focused on 
the objectives. Commitment to both the group and the mission is tied 
to loyalty and cohesion. Cohesion is a positive principle. It does not 
mean obedience or uniformity; it means that team members should 
impel each other to strive for excellence, but disagreements cannot spill 
over from cause to person. Commitment flourishes when we know why 
we are doing what we are doing, and it is strengthened through partici-
pation in decision making. Trust is not magically given; trust can only 
be built. The basis for trust lies in both character and competence.10 
Communication should be the way, commitment should be the means, 
and trust should be the end. I believe that a consistent focus on CCT 
creates good interpersonal skills and enhances emotional engagement, 
outshining simple transactional relationships. It also paints a clear 
picture of my role and my expectations of the team, and vice versa.
“I will be an operator when I can and the leader when I must.” This 
might be the most controversial statement a military leader can make. 
Figure 1: The Circle
Figure 2: The Triangle
12
CTX | Vol. 4, No. 2
Communication should 
be the way, commitment 
should be the means, and 
trust should be the end.
I am pursuing the tenets that 
make a great team and inspire 
everyone to take action. I am 
not a leader simply because 
I wear an “I am a leader” 
sign around my neck.
Does following this tenet result in ambiguity regarding the leader’s authority? 
Is it a description of an inconsistent and insecure leader? No, I do not believe 
so. As I said previously, I cannot afford to be superior, and I cannot afford 
to be separated from my team. I do not seek leadership for the sake of the 
title or position; I am pursuing the tenets that make a great team and inspire 
everyone to take action. I am not a leader simply because I wear an “I am a 
leader” sign around my neck. 
By being transparent and consistent in my deliberation of the Circle and the 
Triangle, I believe there will be no contradictions or ambivalence between 
me and my men. Fundamentally, it is a mission command style: being 
comfortable with relinquishing control and authority.11 Military leadership is 
all about action and accomplishing missions. I believe the marginal effect of 
squeezing that last little extra potential from my team is within the domain of 
relation orientation in the team. Being an operator when you can and a leader 
when you must might be a luxury. Taking such a position might be culturally 
dependent (e.g., nationality, service, history/legacy). Nevertheless, the lessons 
I have learned continue to work for me as a leader in the Royal Norwegian 
Navy. I will continue to utilize those experiences and search for new lessons in 
the future. To once again paraphrase Mahatma Ghandhi: Lead as if you were 
going to die tomorrow. Build leadership as if you would live forever. v
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Stability operations, such as the current campaign of the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, differ from offensive 
or defensive operations in their purpose. According to U.S. Field Manual 3-0, 
Operations, the purpose of stability operations is to provide a secure environ-
ment, secure land areas, meet the critical needs of the populace, gain support 
for the host-nation government, and shape the environment for interagency 
and host-nation success.1 Stability operations focus on construction rather 
than destruction. But current armed forces are not well trained to conduct 
such operations. 
I have seen different approaches and experiments in how to achieve a stability 
operation’s purpose. After being in Afghanistan for three years, I believe that 
unity of command, just as in conventional battle (i.e., offensive or defensive 
operations), is necessary for the success of any stability mission. This article 
reflects my personal experience with the mission command of a stability 
operation in the Kunduz area, ISAF Afghanistan, in 2011.
The Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kunduz
Until October 2013, a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) operated in 
Kunduz, a province in the north of Afghanistan. The PRT’s overall tasks were 
to improve security, extend the authority of the Afghan government, and 
facilitate reconstruction. To fulfill these tasks, the PRT consisted of several 
construction teams and provided a home for several German, U.S., and 
multinational units to enforce security, stability, and partnering. 
The PRT in Kunduz belonged to the ISAF Regional Command North (RC 
North), a German-led headquarters based in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, 
located 100 miles (161 km) west of Kunduz. The commander of the PRT, a 
German colonel, was the official battlespace commander 
of the Kunduz area. Despite the fact that all units operated 
within his battlespace, however, the PRT commander had 
little command authority over these units. This often led 
to friction, not only between Afghans and ISAF but also 
among the different multinational units.
Forces Located in and around the PRT
At least 13 different forces from various countries operated 
in the Kunduz area. First, the PRT had civilian-military 
teams that were responsible for rebuilding Afghan infra-
structure, public authority, education systems, and medical 
support. The PRT also had its own security company, 
military police, medical center, maintenance company, 
The PRT Kunduz: An Unsuccessful Command Structure
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Stability operations focus 
on construction rather than 
destruction. But current armed 
forces are not well trained to 
conduct such operations.
Mazar-e-Sharif lies about 100 miles 
(161 km) west of the Kunduz PRT.
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support and supply company, and on-post 
staff. The PRT commander was in charge 
of these troops. 
Several forces not under the PRT com-
mander’s authority were also placed in, 
or close to, the PRT camp. One such 
force was Task Force Kunduz (TF KDZ), 
a battalion-sized unit tasked to train 
the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
enforce security in the Kunduz area. Led 
by a lieutenant colonel and consisting of 
two infantry companies, reconnaissance 
teams, and supporters, TF KDZ was constantly in the field to enforce security. 
The TF KDZ leader established his own tactical operating center (TOC) away 
from the PRT’s headquarters. He received his orders from and reported 
directly back to the operations center in Mazar-e-Sharif.  
Another force was Task Force Mazar-e-Sharif (TF MeS). Structured similarly to 
TF KDZ, TF MeS was sent to Kunduz because of the highly insecure situation 
in the Kunduz area. Its TOC remained in Mazar-e-Sharif, and its commander 
likewise reported directly to the joint operations center RC North. 
A reinforced paratroop company of the operational mentoring and liaison 
team (OMLT) had its place inside the PRT as well. Despite its task to mentor 
and train an ANA company in Kunduz, the company reported directly to the 
OMLT senior mentor, a colonel who had his chair in Mazar-e-Sharif. German 
special operations forces and intelligence maintained their own compounds 
within the PRT camp, and used their own chain of command. An American 
infantry battalion had its camp nearby; it had its own TOC and reported to 
its U.S. higher headquarters, not to the PRT. U.S. SOF had camps close to the 
PRT, but they reported to their headquarters in Bagram, Afghanistan. Fur-
thermore, the U.S. and German aviation units received their orders from and 
reported to their aviation operations centers in Mazar-e-Sharif. 
Additional multinational police units who mentored and trained Afghan 
national civil order police had their camps close to the PRT. Multinational 
military and police units located near and inside the PRT were subordinate 
to the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan and/or to Combined Security 
Transition Command–Afghanistan. They 
partnered with ANA and the Afghan 
National Police in Kunduz. 
DYNCORP, a private American corpora-
tion, trained Afghan National Police 
personnel in its compound next to the 
PRT. Because of its civilian character, 
DYNCORP did not follow any military 
orders at all. To round out the picture, 
many nongovernmental organizations also 
operated in the Kunduz area. 
The TF KDZ leader established 
his own TOC away from the 
PRT’s headquarters. He received 
his orders from and reported 
directly back to the operations 
center in Mazar-e-Sharif.
German Federal Minister of Defense 
Thomas de Maizière, center, talks to 
German service members assigned to 
the Kunduz Provincial Reconstruction 
Team in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
Many of the various units operating 
in the Kunduz PRT took their orders 
only from their seniors located 
161 km west in Mazar-e-Sharif.
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Common Goals, Fragmented Command
All of the units operating in Kunduz had common objectives: to improve 
security, extend the authority of the Afghan government, and facilitate recon-
struction. That called for unity of effort. Joint Publication 1-02, Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines unity of effort as the 
“coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the partici-
pants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is 
the product of successful unified action.”2 Unified action, then, is “the synchro-
nization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and 
nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.”3 
Unfortunately, despite their common goals, the many different chains of com-
mand in and around the PRT presented a fragmented patchwork of decision 
makers rather than a clear and unambiguous mission command. 
How did this fragmented command structure work? Designated as the bat-
tlespace commander, the PRT commander was the first point of contact for 
high-ranking Afghan officials in Kunduz. He routinely called in all the chiefs 
of the different units to synchronize courses of actions. But coordination and 
synchronization of efforts and actions became difficult because the chiefs led 
their forces in the fields, and their staffs and TOCs were all in separate loca-
tions. Initially, for better coordination, different units operated in different, 
defined areas (called “boxes”) within the Kunduz area. But it turned out that 
all units focused only on their own “box,” rather than looking at the bigger 
picture. Commanders did not need to think outside their unit’s responsibili-
ties because they were not subordinate to the PRT commander. It turned out 
that this kind of fragmented mission command depended highly on com-
manders’ personalities and whether they were willing to work together. As 
a result, individual commanders were able to jeopardize a common strategy 
because of personal incentives. That in turn sometimes caused major setbacks 
in achieving common goals. 
As an example, a specific Afghan village was damaged in several local fire-
fights, and the village population turned to ISAF forces for help. TF KDZ 
promised to help provide reconstruction. The reconstruction teams of the 
PRT, however, supported another village and thus did not have sufficient 
resources to back up TF KDZ’s promise. The village that did have the PRT’s 
reconstruction support was a well-known supporter of insurgency, but the 
reconstruction teams knew practically nothing of any insurgents inside the 
village because they received different information from their (PRT) TOC. The 
PRT’s TOC had no incentives to support TF KDZ because it followed its own 
priority list and did not share TF KDZ’s counterinsurgency priorities. 
Results of an Unsynchronized Command
Based on my personal experience, many of the different units operating 
in the Kunduz area followed their own purposes. The PRT was not able to 
synchronize military actions with reconstruction and intelligence. It was not 
able to focus effort on the work that most needed doing. It seemed that all 
units concentrated their efforts on something that made sense to them but 
did not contribute to a common strategy. There was no concept of how to 
coordinate all of these goals and activities. Eventually, such unsynchronized 
actions aroused negative attitudes among Afghans toward ISAF. Sometimes 
Individual commanders 
were able to jeopardize a 
common strategy because 
of personal incentives. 
That in turn sometimes 
caused major setbacks in 
achieving common goals.
The PRT was not able to 
synchronize military actions 
with reconstruction and 
intelligence. It seemed that all 
units concentrated their efforts 
on something that made sense 
to them but did not contribute 
to a common strategy.
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within only a few days or even hours, all previous efforts to 
secure, convince, and help the people were wasted due to these 
kinds of uncoordinated efforts and the negative propaganda 
spread by insurgents. Over time, there were many setbacks for 
the PRT in Kunduz.
Unsynchronized command also caused shortcomings in 
combat support, decreased situational awareness, and, even 
worse, blue-on-blue contacts. In Kunduz, each of the different 
multinational forces designated its own quick-reaction force in 
case of emergency. If such forces were not organically inherent 
to the unit or already specially designated, further combat 
support or combat service support had to be requested from 
other forces. But the ambiguous chain of command caused 
friction among those requesting and employing such required 
support. As a consequence, the PRT’s TOC often did not know 
which assets were requested from which of the different forces 
and how the different available assets were being used. For 
example, if some forces requested immediate support after 
being ambushed, they called their own TOC (wherever it was 
located). That TOC then tried to figure out who could provide 
help with available assets and who could issue immediate 
orders. This lack of unity of command often led to time delays 
that caused fighting troops to remain longer in a dangerous 
area without quick support.4
Even when it came to supporting one’s own troops, situational 
awareness differed among the various forces. For example, in 
one situation, German helicopters received the order to pick 
up a wounded soldier. The chain was as follows: The troops 
called their TOC in Kunduz. The TOC called the personal 
evacuation coordination center (PECC) in Mazar-e-Sharif. 
The PECC in Mazar-e-Sharif had to figure out which medical 
evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters were available and then 
issued orders to the Air-MEDEVAC TOC in Kunduz. The Air-
MEDEVAC TOC launched the helicopters more than one hour 
after the ground troops requested MEDEVAC support. After 
a further 25 minutes’ “notes to move”—the time it took after 
getting the call to be ready to act—the helicopters overflew an 
insurgent hotspot and were hit by small-arms fire. Based on a 
debrief of the pilots, it turned out that the crew had no clue 
what was happening on the ground because they received all 
of their information from their TOC in Mazar-e-Sharif. That 
TOC had a completely different situational picture than one 
from the Kunduz area would have had. Sadly, the helicopter 
was only five flight-minutes away from the wounded soldier, 
but it took nearly an hour and a half to pick him up—even 
though the MEDEVAC crew did not have any parallel ongoing 
missions that day. 
A second, much worse example involved a PRT patrol that had 
the task of speaking with elders of an Afghan village regarding 
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the progress of reconstruction. Not knowing where ISAF forces were 
operating, the patrol, with its civilian cars, moved into the box of an 
American infantry unit without telling them. The patrol was am-
bushed by insurgents and returned fire, not knowing that they were 
firing in the direction of a company of TF KDZ that had their posi-
tion in the vicinity of the ambush site, just outside of the American 
box. TF KDZ returned fire, not knowing that they aimed toward the 
PRT patrol instead of the insurgents. It took a long time for the PRT 
patrol to solve the tricky situation and link up with the Americans 
because of different chains of command, different information about 
the situation on the ground, different procedures, and different radio 
frequencies and unknown call signs. Luckily, nobody was injured in 
the event. 
As a further example, SOF conducted many night raids within the 
Kunduz area. They did not share their activities and plans with other 
forces, including the PRT, for security reasons. However, if someone 
was captured or killed, Afghan officials turned for information to the 
commander of the PRT, who could not respond immediately because 
of limited knowledge of the situation. 
These kinds of issues did not contribute to unity of effort. In Kunduz, 
command relationships have tended to rely on commanders’ person-
alities rather than on common objectives. A fragmented mission com-
mand produced friction that jeopardized long-term goals. Eventually, 
Afghans came to mistrust ISAF’s ability to stabilize the region, which 
made it more likely that the Afghan population and their leaders 
would turn toward the insurgency.
What Can We Learn?
The question is, what can we learn from this? There are two simple 
lessons from Kunduz regarding leadership that are well-known but 
still important to reiterate. First, if there is one battlespace, the 
commander of that area should have command authority over all 
forces operating in his battlespace. Unity of command, according to 
Joint Publication 1-02, is the “operation of all forces under a single 
responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and 
employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose.”5 Thus, there 
should be only one unified mission command that is responsible 
for coordinating and controlling actions toward common goals. 
Synchronized efforts contribute to a “leader’s responsibility to under-
stand, visualize, describe, lead, and assess.”6 Such a unified mission 
command “provides commanders and staff with a philosophy for 
operating in an uncertain environment as opposed to trying to create 
certainty and imposing order and control over a situation.”7 With 
unity of command, the personal motivations of subordinates become 
less important than the coordination of authority among different 
commanders.
A second lesson is providing liaison elements. If time matters during 
ongoing missions, quick reaction is most important. Often, leaders 
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of different task forces establish their movable TOCs in the fields, or far away 
from the PRT’s TOC. Only a direct link to all different forces, however, can ad-
equately provide sufficient information and process requests. This is especially 
true if assembled forces come from different countries or units. Direct links, 
such as liaison elements, contribute to shared information and to a shared 
understanding in both directions.
In conclusion, the command structure in Kunduz was a mess. Without a clear 
and unambiguous chain of command, things went awry. Unity of effort was 
just barely achieved, and it was only the common threat that forced all of 
those different units to work together. The remedy for this situation is simple 
and not really new: create unity of command and establish liaison elements. 
Sometimes doctrines, often based on bloody lessons, are worth using. In cases 
of emergency and to achieve common goals devoid of personal motivations, a 
clear, single-headed chain of command is the way to success. v
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While working at the ISAF 
SOF HQ, I developed a clear 
picture of the strategic purpose 
of ISAF SOF, not only through 
a better understanding of the 
written directives but also 
through field experience with 
the units on the ground.
In 2008, my first impression of 
the situation was that SOTFs 
were focusing more on the so-
called “sexy” SF mission—that is, 
direct action—than on providing 
military assistance to PRCs.
I serve in the 34th Special Forces Battalion of the Hungarian 
Army. While my battalion is not the most prominent SOF unit in the world, 
I work in the SOF realm and have operational experience leading SOF nations 
in the hottest battlefields, including Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, I was 
the assistant team leader of the Hungarian Military Assistant and Liaison 
Team, NATO Training Mission–Iraq. I have been deployed three times to 
Afghanistan, two of which were SOF-related deployments. In my first SOF-
related deployment in 2008, I was a partnering officer in the International 
Security Assistance Force Special Operations Forces Headquarters (ISAF SOF 
HQ). Then, in 2012, I served as a Hungarian Special Operations Forces Special 
Operations Task Unit liaison officer. One of the greatest advantages of these 
two deployments was that I could experience the SOF environment from a 
multilevel perspective. 
While working at the ISAF SOF HQ, I developed a clear picture of the strategic 
purpose of ISAF SOF, not only through a better understanding of the written 
directives but also through field experience with the units on the ground. I 
was responsible for the partnering task assigned to four nations; the units 
associated with the task were spread across Afghanistan’s northern and western 
provinces. The task clearly stated the strategic intent, which was to support a 
safe and secure environment by establishing a provincial response company 
(PRC)—an Afghan quick-reaction, special operations–capable police unit—for 
each province. The end goal of this process is for these independent PRCs to be 
capable of operating throughout their assigned area, maintaining their equip-
ment, and sustaining manpower over the long term. 
Direct Action vs. Military Assistance: Five Observations
The designated ISAF SOF special operations task forces (SOTFs) are responsible 
for training and advising the PRCs during the PRCs’ establishment, initial 
operational development, and full operational capability phases. In my 
view, these responsibilities are being only partially fulfilled. In 2008, my first 
impression of the situation was that SOTFs were focusing more on the so-
called “sexy” SF mission—that is, direct action—than on providing military 
assistance to PRCs. SOTFs still viewed PRCs as important, but direct action 
always took priority. I know this perception had not significantly changed as 
of 2012. In the following sections, I share five observations that support why I 
think task forces view military assistance as less important than direct action. 
Slow Development of Administrative Tools
In order to properly control, advise, and assist a designated partner unit, it is 
not enough for SOTFs to teach the unit how to shoot, break into houses, or 
handcuff and body search. SOTFs should have a proper system for all-around 
accountability, including manpower data (e.g., complete names, birthdates, 
family), logistics, and all other necessary databases. In 2008, several SOTFs 
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already had their designated PRC. Yet, by 2012 there were still only a few PRCs, 
and those units had access to an incomplete database that was scarcely useful. 
I understand the difficulties of human resource administration in an environ-
ment where the public sector is basically absent, and I cannot blame any unit 
for not possessing those administrative databases. But the fact that only minor 
changes have occurred since 2008 suggests that minimal effort has been put 
into developing these administrative tools. 
Logistics are based on numbers, and these numbers are—or should be—the 
same in any language, whether it be Pashto or English or anything else. When 
we initially provide the PRCs with some equipment, we should keep tracking 
the numbers and the inventories to be sure that the equipment is used for 
the intended purpose. Many PRCs have received huge amounts of material 
support from ISAF and other agencies. The partnering reporting system within 
the ISAF SOF bureaucracy includes very detailed rosters of what each PRC is 
supposed to have, but the PRC accounts and these rosters often do not match. 
I do not know why this is happening, but this inconsistency definitely requires 
more attention. 
PRCs Are Operationally Excluded
ISAF SOF directives determined the “Afghan face” participation percentage—
that is, the number of individuals from the PRCs designated to participate in 
a given mission—for all operations, and according to my knowledge, these 
directives were never disobeyed. But the process for determining the per-
centage was still not conducted as expected. I had the chance to look through 
and listen to many concept-of-operation (CONOP) briefings during the PRC 
approval process and was impressed by the level of detail of the presentations, 
which included the names and call signs of all the PRC participants in the 
presentations’ task organization section. (I am not surprised that the final 
CONOP was over 40 slides—such a waste of time and energy!) These slides 
always received approval, but only very rarely did anyone verify how they were 
implemented in the operation. 
All PRCs go through basic and advanced training, and most of the partnered 
PRCs have finished these courses. After completing both levels of training, a 
PRC should be able to plan and conduct operations independently. Neverthe-
less, PRC leaders are not involved in the operation planning process, and even 
worse, they are notified of an operation only a day or even a few hours prior 
to the mission. This practice does not support the operational experiment of 
preparing PRCs to operate independently when ISAF SOF withdraws. To make 
matters worse, the SOTF camps are not located near the units they partner 
with, a situation that does nothing to support the training mission. Physical 
distance makes it even harder to involve the PRCs in operational planning and 
execution, especially if SOTFs are reluctant to do so in the first place.
Limited Intel Sharing
Operational security is always the largest issue in an uncertain environment. 
Speaking from personal experience, I have never seen any PRC member in-
volved in the intelligence process on a tactical level. Again, I am aware of how 
difficult it can be to manage sensitive information while working with indig-
enous forces, but we also have to consider the fact that without a common 
intelligence picture and operational capability, the final result will be edentate.
PRC leaders are not involved 
in the operation planning 
process, and even worse, they 
are notified of an operation 
only a day or even a few 
hours prior to the mission.
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Inadequate Resources for PRC Basic Training
The basic training for PRC members takes place at the Special Police Training 
Center in Maidan Wardak province. The main instruction is given by a 
civilian company, but SOTFs are expected to provide assistant instructors. 
The number of these assistant instructors depends on how many trainees 
the SOTFs send from their partnered PRCs. This has always been a serious 
problem, however, because none of the SOTFs is willing to send its operators 
to assist with this course, claiming that the operators are overloaded with 
other tasks. There should not be other tasks while conducting military as-
sistance. The most important thing these task forces should be doing is to pro-
vide the PRCs with appropriate training from the beginning, so that when the 
SOTF’s partnered unit returns from the training center, it is well positioned to 
start advanced training or participate in operations suited to its skills. 
A Focus on High-Tech Systems
The members of the coalition are using advanced technology to eliminate 
our opponents. A $1 million rocket hits a house where the enemy is hidden, 
soldiers use satellite-based communications systems, operations are drone 
dependent (CONOPs are not usually approved unless higher command has an 
eye on the target and is in control of the mission), and armored vehicles can 
resist a direct hit from rocket-propelled grenades with no significant damage. 
These are all great assets to protect our operators, but we also have to keep in 
mind that once we leave our partnered units alone, they will have only AK-47s 
and light-skinned vehicles. No surprise: our opponents also have these assets. 
Considering that the last decade of fighting did not bring resounding success 
to the coalition in the struggle against our opponents, even though we applied 
tremendous amounts of high-tech equipment, it is advisable to question 
whether we have trained the PRC in the right tactics, or whether we wanted to 
prove something else.
Conclusion
These are just a few observations supporting the idea that SOTFs are biased 
toward direct action. Many of the SOTF units that I met were more excited 
to kill or capture enemies of much lesser importance, and mark some ad-
ditional scratches on their weapons, than focus on their PRCs. This is wasted 
energy, since there are always more enemies to replace the ones who are killed. 
Unfortunately, for these units, the glory still comes from how many Afghans 
they have killed, not from how many they have taught to kill. This is where, I 
think, the strategic purpose of SOF in Afghanistan is misunderstood. There are 
no perfect solutions. The Afghans, however, are fighters just like us; they fight 
in their homeland for their country against their kind. We have to build trust 
through such measures as sharing co-located camps, so we can involve them 
more deeply in a process that should ultimately become theirs. v
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On 29 February 2000, a one-page note, scribbled on a piece of 
paper, arrived at a newspaper office in Hyderabad, in India’s southern state 
of Andhra Pradesh. The “Indian Muslim Mohammadi Mujahideen (IMMM) 
has been formed,” it announced. According to the note, the organization was 
“committed to eradicate the western culture from India” and, as a first part of 
this campaign, had bombed cinemas that ran pornographic films.1 
The note ended law enforcement agencies’ search for the perpetrators of a 
number of incidents that had taken place a month earlier. These included a 
bomb blast at a sweets shop owned by a sympathizer of the Rashtriya Sway-
amsevak Sangh, a Hindu right-wing organization with a pan-Indian presence; 
two unexploded devices recovered from a movie theater and a location near 
the high-security Defence Research and Development Organisation labora-
tory; and explosions at two movie theaters, one in Andhra Pradesh and 
the other in the neighboring state of Maharashtra. All of the recovered and 
exploded bombs had been devised from the same substances: potassium 
nitrate, potassium permanganate, aluminum powder, and sugar.
Less than two months after the note’s appearance, the IMMM’s chief, Azam 
Ghauri—who was also a top leader of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba 
(LeT)—was killed in an encounter with police, and the threat from the 
IMMM was thought to be over.2  The IMMM, however, was only one of many 
offshoots of a larger organization, the Students Islamic Movement of India 
(SIMI),3 that set about implementing SIMI president Shahid Badr Falahi’s 1992 
pledge: “Muslims organise themselves and stand up to defend the com-
munity.”4 Security agencies were able to swiftly neutralize organizations like 
the IMMM and the Mujahideen Islam e-Hind (MIH), another SIMI offshoot, 
mostly because the groups sought instant publicity for their actions, which 
exposed them to the security establishment. Law enforcement agencies’ expe-
rience with the Indian Mujahideen (IM) has proved to be different, however.
In the following three sections, we analyze the unique operational dynamics of 
the IM, which, we argue, are responsible for its cohesion as well as its success 
as a terrorist organization. On the basis of some recent findings, we examine 
the IM’s cadre recruitment, explosives manufacturing, external and internal 
linkages, attack patterns, and attempts to transform itself from a guardian of 
wronged Muslims in India to an avenger of ill-treated Muslims worldwide. 
We argue that the IM’s future and its success in carrying out attacks are criti-
cally linked to India’s internal efforts to target the IM’s unique strengths and 
neutralize the support that the IM receives from external sources. 
The IM’s Developing Ideology: Three Distinct Phases
On 17 July 2013, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), the organization 
that New Delhi set up after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks as the primary 
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agency to investigate all terrorist incidents in India, stated in its charge sheet 
that the IM “was formed in 2003 after ultra-radicalised Muslim youth segre-
gated from the Students Islamic Movement of India.”5 Similar to the IMMM 
and the MIH, the IM has its roots in the avowed need to radicalize the SIMI’s 
plan of action even further. In 2001 and 2002, a rebellion of sorts was brewing 
within the SIMI. A faction broke away from the less-radical parent organiza-
tion and sought new cadres who were already sufficiently radicalized; their 
extremism was further boosted by contact with external militants such as the 
LeT. This new faction became the IM. The IM, in a way, was also a result of the 
LeT’s “Karachi Project,” which had sought to raise a new network of jihad-
ists.6 In its 17 July 2013 charge sheet, the NIA added that the IM cadres “do 
not believe in India’s Constitution and IM’s members nurse communal hatred 
against the Hindu community.”7 
Since the IM had been formed on an agenda of waging a violent war against 
Hindu India, no spell of moderate militancy separated the IM’s birth from its 
first act of violence. Within a relatively short time period, however, the IM 
underwent three distinct phases of ideological expansion: traversing from a 
narrow India-centric ideology to revenge-seeking and eventually embracing 
the concerns of Muslims in other countries. This is not to suggest that the IM 
abandoned or progressed beyond any of the causes that it initially champi-
oned. Rather, it acquired new additional causes to fight for. In effect, the IM’s 
successes in the Indian theater and its constant ideological oscillation dem-
onstrated the IM’s widening profile and proclivity for becoming an integral 
part of the global jihad. Such a broadening of ideology was important, for it 
fit in well with the amplification of jihadist terrorism in South Asia, especially 
boosted by the prospects of instability in post-2014 Afghanistan.  
Guardian of Wronged Muslims in India
According to an estimate by an intelligence agency, 
By 2005, the IM had firmly established a complete terror outfit, with 
different sections in charge of providing manpower and sourcing 
explosives and bomb components. A specialist computer-services 
cell was already in place. Different leaders were already travelling 
countrywide, liaising between cells.8 
The IM’s war on Hindu India began in 2005 with a string of urban attacks, 
which included serial explosions in the national capital, Delhi—two bombs 
exploded at busy marketplaces and a third exploded inside a Delhi Transport 
Corporation bus, killing 62 people.9 There was some question about who 
had carried out the attacks. The LeT was initially suspected. A Delhi Police 
special cell team also claimed to have killed the mastermind of the blasts in 
an operation in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2007. 
In 2006, the IM carried out serial bombings in the Hindu pilgrimage town 
of Varanasi, in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Three explosions, one in a crowded 
temple and two in a railway station, killed 21 people and injured 62 others.10 
In 2013, an arrested IM cadre who had participated in the 2006 bombings told 
his interrogators that the timers and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) used 
in the Varanasi blasts were similar to the ones used in the 2005 Delhi blasts.11 
Since the formation of the IM had remained unannounced, these attacks 
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were thought to have been perpe-
trated by Pakistan-based outfits, 
like the LeT, and the Bangladesh-
based Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami. 
The fact that the LeT was still 
perpetrating large-scale attacks, 
like the July 2006 explosions 
that targeted the train systems in 
Mumbai and killed 200 people, 
made the task of looking for 
another perpetrator seem unnec-
essary.12 Indian security personnel 
felt comfortable in the assump-
tion that because the LeT was still 
active within India, the LeT must 
be behind the Varanasi attacks.
The IM’s first-ever ideological affirmation came in the form of its first mani-
festo, which the group released in 2007 after it had bombed court complexes 
in Lucknow, Varanasi, and Faizabad. The manifesto claimed that the blasts 
were intended to “punish local lawyers” who had physically attacked some 
suspects who were being held for an abortive kidnap plot against politician 
Rahul Gandhi by the terrorist group Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM). The mani-
festo, however, spoke broadly of “wounds given by the idol worshippers to the 
Indian Muslims”13 and the demolition of the Babri Masjid, a disputed mosque 
in the state of Uttar Pradesh that Hindu radicals had demolished in 1992 
following violent countrywide communal riots. Emphasizing the miserable 
condition of the Muslims in the country, the manifesto concluded, “If you 
want to be a successful person in India, then you should be an idol worshipper 
and kill Muslims.”14 
The IM released two other manifestos in 2008 and 2010, following more 
bombings in Delhi and Varanasi, respectively. Both documents pointed at 
the role of “the Supreme Court, the high courts, the lower courts and all the 
commissions” for failing the Muslims in India. The 2008 manifesto, running 
nearly 14 pages and titled The Rise of Jihad, indicated that the bombings were 
carried out to avenge the 2002 anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat. “In the light 
of the injustice and wrongs on the Muslims of Gujarat, we advance our jihad 
and call all our brethren under it to unite and answer these irresolute kafireen 
[infidels] of India,” it said.15 The 2010 manifesto, titled Let’s Feel the Pain 
Together, said that the attack in 2010 served as a reminder to Hindus that the 
IM had “resolved that none of your mandirs [temples] will remain safe until 
and unless all our occupied Masjids [mosques] throughout India are returned 
back to the Muslims.”16 
When the IM targeted the Indian judiciary in explosions outside the Delhi 
high court in 2011, its attacks had already spanned the entire country and were 
being carried out in almost all of the major urban centers, including New 
Delhi and the country’s financial capital, Mumbai. Attacks in Ahmedabad and 
Pune in the west, Hyderabad and Bangalore in the south, Patna and Bodh 
Gaya in the east, and Delhi in the north made the IM look like a pan-Indian 
outfit capable of taking its activities to almost any corner of the country. 
Among these attacks was a 2010 incident in which two bikers fired on tourists 
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gathered at the gate of the Jama Masjid in the Old Delhi area. The drive-by 
shooting, the only attack of this nature carried out by the IM so far, was to be 
followed by an explosion, but the explosive, which was fitted into a car parked 
in the area, did not go off due to faulty circuitry. This attack was carried out 
on 19 September 2010, days before the opening of the Commonwealth Games 
in the national capital. Two Taiwanese nationals sustained bullet wounds.17
By the time of the Jama Masjid attack in 2010, the IM had stopped mailing 
its usual manifestos claiming responsibility for its attacks, so investigative 
agencies had to rely on interrogations of arrested IM cadres to unravel the 
intentions behind the explosions. The IM had also diversified its target selec-
tion, demonstrating that it was indeed willing to go after almost any target, 
with the sole intention of maximizing fatalities. Revenge against Hindus and 
the institutions facilitating the dominance of Hinduism over the Muslims 
remained the proclaimed raison d’être of the IM—at least for awhile. 
Avenging the Deaths of Its Cadres
Over a period of time, the IM began perpetrating terror attacks even to avenge 
the deaths of its cadres, representing a drastic climbdown from its larger goal 
of fighting on behalf of the Muslim community. According to interrogation 
reports, the explosions in Pune, Maharashtra, on 1 August 2012 were intended 
to avenge the killing of imprisoned IM cadre Qateel Siddique by his cell mates 
in a Pune prison a couple of months earlier.18 The attack included five coordi-
nated low-intensity explosions on a busy road in the heart of Pune, injuring 
one person. Another live IED was later recovered from the area.
Guardian of Wronged Muslims Worldwide
Within a year of the Pune attack, the IM had expanded its 
worldview, aiming to take up the causes of persecuted Muslims 
outside of India. Blasts that targeted the Buddhist shrine in 
Bodh Gaya, Bihar, in July 2013 were said to have been in 
response to violence against the Rohingyas, a Muslim popula-
tion in Myanmar, by members of the ethnic Buddhist majority. 
Arrested IM cadre Umair Siddiqui told his interrogators that he 
had been approached by another IM cadre, Haider Ali, about 
the Rohingyas’ situation, and both had finalized the plan to 
carry out the attack at the Buddhist shrine.19 Earlier, arrested 
LeT cadre Abdul Karim Tunda revealed that the LeT had also 
been part of the Bodh Gaya attack; during his interrogation, 
Tunda detailed the LeT’s plan,20 in collaboration with the IM, to 
recruit Rohingyas and carry out the attack.
On 27 October 2013, explosions in Patna, Bihar, were report-
edly carried out to protest communal riots in Muzaffarnagar, 
in the neighboring state of Uttar Pradesh.21 The recovery of a 
large amount of explosives at Ranchi, Jharkhand, on 4 No-
vember 201322 demonstrated the IM’s plan to maintain the 
momentum in its violent campaign. Similarly, the recovery 
of documents from an IM safe house in Ranchi, including 
handwritten notes from IM members detailing future action 
plans, pointed to the possibility that the IM would carry 
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out future attacks on Buddhist 
shrines, foreign tourists, and 
public installations in the state of 
Chhattisgarh.23 
The IM’s wide array of uncon-
nected objectives underscores the 
fact that, instead of remaining a 
purely ideology-based organiza-
tion with both local and global as-
pirations, the IM could be willing 
to carry out attacks for almost any 
cause that suits its convenience. 
Believed to be controlled by 
external forces (including the JeM, 
the LeT, and the Pakistani external 
intelligence agency known as Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI]), and to nurture 
the aspiration of making common cause with al Qaeda,24 IM leaders could be 
looking well beyond the traditional outfit that was triggering explosions only 
on behalf of wronged Indian Muslims. Although the IM is largely defined as 
an indigenous or homegrown terror organization within India, its leadership 
does not appear to be averse to eventually transforming the outfit into a pan-
Islamist terrorist operation. 
A Formula for Success: Three Operational Patterns of the IM
In this section, we show that, apart from its emergence as an alleged protector 
of Muslims’ interests, the IM’s success as a terrorist formation is based on three 
distinct operational patterns: its external support base and linkages, its unique 
and secretive recruitment drives, and its manufacture of explosives.    
External Support Base and Linkages 
As explained earlier, the IM is by no means the first-ever homegrown Islamist 
outfit to wage a war within India. It has several predecessors—the SIMI, 
the IMMM, the MIH, and the Al Ummah, an organization born in the early 
1990s with the intent to radicalize Muslim youth in the southern Indian state 
of Tamil Nadu. However, the way that the IM carries on with its shadowy 
bombing campaign, over a large swath of the country’s territory, makes it 
a completely different, and far superior, entity than its predecessors in its 
organizational capacities and its ability to withstand the kinetic measures of 
the state.
Indian officials’ assessments have routinely pointed at the IM’s connections 
with Pakistan, contending that without the continuing assistance that IM 
leaders receive from India’s western neighbor, the outfit’s potency would have 
been far more limited. Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde’s description 
of the IM says that it draws “motivation and sustenance from inimical forces 
operating from across the Western border.”25 India claims that two of the IM’s 
founders, brothers Riyaz Bhatkal and Iqbal Bhatkal, are based in Pakistan 
under the protection of state agencies including the ISI. Indeed, both Bhatkal 
brothers, along with top IM leaders such as Abdul Subhan Qureshi and Sadiq 
Israr Sheikh, have undergone training in the LeT camps in Pakistan.26 Their 
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names are regularly included in the list of persons, both Indian and Pakistani 
nationals, whom India wants Islamabad to deport from Pakistani territory. 
Interrogations of arrested IM cadres have revealed that several persons within 
Pakistan have extensive connections with the IM outfit. The Indian home 
minister has claimed that a number of IM cadres “were sent to Pakistan for 
training in weapon and explosives” and investigations “will throw valuable 
light on the role played by elements based in Pakistan in fomenting acts of 
terrorism in India.”27
Pakistani nationals have taken a direct part in a few of the IM’s operations in 
India. Among the six IM cadres arrested in the 2010 Jama Masjid attack in 
Delhi was a Pakistani operative.28 Zia-ur-Rehman (alias Mohammad Waqas), 
who served as the principal explosive assembler for the IM and was arrested 
in the Indian state of Rajasthan on 21 March 2014, also is from Pakistan. 
Inversely, the IM’s Pakistani connection is a natural corollary of the fact that 
its leaders are based in Pakistan and their actions are believed to be directed by 
the state and by allied non-state agencies like the LeT. According to a report, 
the LeT and the ISI could have influenced individuals and modules within the 
IM, even to the point of promoting specific attacks.29 However, whether such 
nexus, safe haven, and ad hoc support translates into “strict command and 
control over the entire IM network, which is significantly decentralised,” as the 
report claims, remains a matter of debate.30 
Contrary to the definitive official assertions linking the IM to its Pakistani 
sponsors, some recent accounts have pointed to a significant level of au-
tonomy and self-sufficiency in the IM ranks and to the outfit’s ability to carry 
out attacks without any external help. Stephen Tankel’s extensive 2014 report 
on the IM suggested that this jihadist movement constitutes “an internal 
security issue with an external dimension.”31 Indian media reports have also 
underlined that the IM “works on its own and recent attacks have shown that 
they have carried out blasts with no support from Pakistan.”32 Theories 
about the functional independence and self-sufficiency of the IM explain, 
to an extent, the IM’s unique operational dynamics and success. 
At the same time, however, none of the reports and theories points to 
a severing of ties between the IM and its Pakistani mentors. On the 
contrary, the IM’s achievement of a level of self-sufficiency indicates the 
fruition of the LeT/ISI strategy to portray the IM as a wholly homegrown 
terror formation—a key ingredient of Pakistan’s clandestine destabiliza-
tion project, known to Indian officials as the Karachi Project. In the 
words of an unnamed intelligence official, “While it would not be right 
to say that there is no Pakistan patronage any more, the fact is that Inter 
Services Intelligence, the Pakistani spy agency, and the Lashkar-e-Tayiba 
have ensured that the IM becomes self-sufficient.”33 IM cofounder and 
senior leader Syed Mohammed Ahmed Zarar Sidibapa (alias Yasin Bhatkal, 
hailing from the same village as the two Bhatkal brothers), following 
his arrest on 29 August 2013, revealed that the IM wished to 
become a part of the global jihad. The realization of such an 
arguably pretentious and grandiose dream can only be 
facilitated by the LeT.   
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Cadre Recruitment, Modules, 
and Linkages 
Key to the functional efficiency 
of the IM is its somewhat 
unique, personalized recruit-
ment campaign targeting small, 
Muslim-majority towns and vil-
lages in different parts of India. 
Available data suggest that select 
senior leaders of the IM were 
assigned to be at the center of 
highly personalized and closely 
guarded micro recruitment 
drives that targeted technically 
savvy and educated youth, who 
were to function as attack plan-
ners, and petty criminals and the less educated, who would function as the 
more dispensable logistics providers and explosive planters. Available listings 
of IM cadres include men as young as 18 years of age and middle-aged men 
past 50 years. 
IM modules comprising both tech-savvy and illiterate individuals sprang up 
in many of the medium-size and smaller cities of India. Each module is based 
on a formula: keep the cadre profile small and maintain a mixture of new and 
energetic as well as experienced individuals. The modules’ cadres come from 
rural as well as urban areas, such as Azamgarh in the state of Uttar Pradesh, 
which is known to have contributed a large number of jihadists to the Indian 
theaters of conflict, and Seethio, a nondescript village in Jharkhand state that 
is far away from the radar of the Indian intelligence agencies. The IM had 
set up a module in Ranchi, Jharkhand, code-named Machhli-5 (Fish-5), to 
assassinate Narendra Modi, the prime ministerial candidate of the right-wing 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).34 According to intelligence sources, a module had 
also been planned in Nepal.35 
Each IM module replicates the model popularized by al Qaeda: it is function-
ally independent, although finances are centrally disbursed by the IM’s top 
leadership. Such functional independence maintains a regime of insularity 
between the modules, protecting the other modules and the IM in the event 
that a particular module is compromised. 
The IM’s seemingly uncomplicated organizational model, however, achieved 
some degree of complexity with reports of a three-way split within the IM in 
late 2008. On 14 May 2008, a day after the IM executed serial explosions in 
the city of Jaipur, killing 80 people and injuring 216 others, an e-mail sent to 
the media claimed that the IM now had three wings: “the Shahbuddin Ghouri 
group to attack southern India, the Mahmood Ghaznavi group operating in 
north India, and the Shaheed Al Zarqawi group that executed suicide at-
tacks.”36 The IM’s identification of the three groups, which were named after 
historical Muslim invaders and al Qaeda leaders, was mostly a propaganda 
exercise. Later in 2008, however, the IM is known to have split into three 
factions in actuality.     
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Following the Batla House encounter in New Delhi in September 2008, in 
which two IM cadres were killed and two others arrested, IM founding mem-
bers Riyaz Bhatkal and Iqbal Bhatkal, based in Pakistan, are believed to have 
tried to gain complete control over the IM’s operations. This initiative, which 
was accompanied by allegations of improper spending of funds by Iqbal, cre-
ated a rift between the Bhatkal brothers and senior member Amir Reza Khan. 
Khan decided to operate separately with his own set of people and formed the 
second IM faction. The third faction of the IM is headed by Mirza Shadaab 
Beg and Mohammad Sajid, both hailing from Azamgarh.37 Beg and Sajid are 
part of the first IM module that executed blasts from 2006 onward at various 
places, including in Uttar Pradesh, Jaipur, Mumbai, and Delhi. Beg is also 
accused of having participated in the 2007 blasts in Gorakhpur and Varanasi. 
Despite the divisions among the IM factions, available evidence suggests that 
the factions’ top leaders maintain their independence while remaining in 
constant communication with one another, seeking advice and assistance.38
Although the SIMI effectively disbanded itself in 2001, following its official 
proscription in India and subsequent governmental actions targeting SIMI 
cadres and facilities, it continued to provide significant support to the IM 
cadres. According to an estimate, by 2000, roughly three years before the 
IM’s creation, the SIMI had some 400 ansars (full-time workers) and 20,000 
ikhwans (sympathizers) in addition to a cell for young children aged seven 
to 11, called the Shahin Force.39 This significant mass of people comprised 
lower-middle- and middle-class families who were energized by the message 
of Islam’s preeminence over the decadent and immoral West and a polytheistic 
Hinduism. It would be correct to assume that 
by the time the IM achieved some influ-
ence in 2005, most of the SIMI cadres 
who had not become foot soldiers of 
the IM became its ikhwans. The SIMI 
cadres continue to provide shelter and 
gathering space for IM cadres who are 
attempting to evade security forces 
following an operation. Among the 
many examples of this collaboration 
between the two groups is an episode 
in which four IM operatives involved 
in the Patna explosions in October 
2013 were hidden in Chhattisgarh for 
a fortnight by a group of erstwhile 
SIMI activists.40 According to intel-
ligence sources, certain IM cadres 
are responsible for maintaining a 
steady linkage with the SIMI. These 
include Hyder Ali, who is wanted 
in connection with the Patna ex-
plosions,41 and Abu Faisal, who is 
suspected of devising a plot to kill 
three judges because they handed 
down an allegedly pro-Hindu 
judgment in the Babri Masjid 
bombing.42 
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Tools of Terror
Aside from the lone drive-by shooting incident at Jama Masjid in Delhi in 
2010, the IM’s modus operandi has involved planting explosives in crowded 
places and is geared toward two objectives: maintaining the bomb planter’s 
anonymity and maximizing casualties. Within this tightly defined mode of 
operation, the IM has benefited from its highly diversified, flexible, and cost-
effective explosives manufacturing process.
To begin with, the IM’s mode of manufacturing explosives involves a central 
bomb-making expert, believed to be Mohammad Waqas, the IM Pakistani 
national. Waqas was described as suffering from a facial paralysis that neces-
sitated frequent visits to doctors within India, a story that allowed Waqas, over 
time, to pass on his techniques to a select band of Indian IM recruits during 
his stays in the country. This group included Yasin Bhatkal, one of the IM’s 
founding members. To carry out explosions on an array of targets while maxi-
mizing fatalities, the IM requires a large number of IED assemblers to fulfill 
the needs of its different modules. After his explosives training with Waqas, 
Bhatkal in turn went on to train other IM cadres in the techniques.43 
The strategy of having an array of explosives assemblers, however, backfired to 
some extent. Starting in 2010, three of the IM’s bombing campaigns—at the 
Jama Masjid, Pune, and Bodh Gaya—were largely unsuccessful. Many of the 
planted explosives either could not be detonated or were ineffective in their 
impact. Forensic experts who examined the unexploded bombs identified 
problems in the circuitry of the devices, among other issues. It is probable that 
the learning process for IED assembly in these cases was somewhat incomplete. 
On many occasions, senior leaders like Yasin Bhatkal also doubled as planters 
of explosives,44 indicating that the IM is indeed non-hierarchical and fully 
geared toward achieving its objectives. This further upholds the organization’s 
operational principle of keeping its module strength small and maximizing the 
output of every member.  
The IM has also experimented with establishing central manufacturing units 
for explosives. Indian officials raided at least four such facilities: one on the 
fringes of the Bhadra forests near Chikmagalur, Karnataka, in 2008; another 
in the Meer Vihar area of Nangloi on the outskirts of New Delhi in 2011; and 
two more in 2013, in the southern coastal city of Mangalore, Karnataka, and 
in Hyderabad, the capital of Andhra Pradesh. As many as 90 ready-to-use 
IEDs were recovered from the raided facilities in Mangalore and Hyderabad.45 
Also recovered from the Mangalore facilities were 50 magnets. Interrogation of 
Yasin Bhatkal revealed that the IM had planned46 to develop sticky IEDs and 
use them on freight trains that carried petroleum products, in an attempt to 
turn the entire train into a mega bomb. 
The IM has manufactured its explosives predominantly using locally available 
chemicals. As a result, its IEDs contain less research department explosive 
(known as RDX), which has to be imported from foreign countries and is thus 
both harder to procure and more easily traceable than local products. Am-
monium nitrate, which continues to be available in the Indian markets even 
after a 2011 sale ban by the government,47 has remained a primary component 
in the IM’s explosives throughout the group’s bomb-making career.48 On some 
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occasions, nitro-gelatin sourced from private suppliers49 has also been used in 
IM explosives. Police sources reveal that the IM may be using stolen industrial 
explosives as well for manufacturing its IEDs.50 While the explosive content 
of the IM’s IEDs has remained more or less the same, the IM has attempted to 
bring sophistication to the manufacturing process by experimenting with a 
variety of timers. 
Some Shortcomings of Indian Law Enforcement Agencies
Unlike the conflict-affected regions in India’s northeast, the disputed terri-
tory of Jammu and Kashmir, and the states affected by left-wing extremism, 
where New Delhi uses a mix of force and development-centric approaches for 
conflict resolution, there isn’t an official Indian policy toward violence perpe-
trated by the Islamists. Some of the key elements of the investigative agencies’ 
anti-IM policy include pursuing IM cadres who are involved in particular 
attacks and targeting their networks, financial channels, and explosives 
manufacturing. Strengthening intelligence, hardening targets, and recruiting 
security-force personnel have also been key strategies to neutralize the IM 
game plan. This largely reactive approach has appeared successful in the event 
of a terrorist arrest, seizure of explosives, or raid of a module, but looks far less 
successful when the IM has managed to carry out its bombings.    
Apart from India’s inability to pursue the IM leadership based in Pakistan and 
the largely unresponsive attitude of Islamabad toward antiterrorism, Indian 
law enforcement agencies’ overall policy suffers from three interlinked primary 
shortcomings: limited knowledge of the IM, increasing sectarian polariza-
tion in Indian politics with regard to the IM, and the Indian culture’s apathy 
toward in-depth research on counterterrorism. 
Limited Knowledge of the IM
Although hundreds of IM and SIMI cadres have been arrested since 2008 
in connection with the bombings, including many who provided logistical 
assistance to the bombers and IM leaders, there is little indication that the 
agencies have developed any significant understanding of the IM’s modus 
operandi, recruitment patterns, and funding. Only part of the problem has 
been addressed since the NIA came into existence in 2009 and was assigned to 
investigate the IM attacks. The NIA has struggled to gain adequate cooperation 
from the state police departments, and has been handicapped by botched 
investigations conducted by state counterterror units into a number of IM 
attacks prior to the NIA’s formation. The unique and highly diversified opera-
tional tactics of the IM have created additional roadblocks for the NIA, even as 
NIA agents pursue leads generated from arrests of individual cadres. 
The 29 August 2013 arrest of IM cofounder/leader Yasin Bhatkal has been 
the biggest achievement so far for the NIA vis-à-vis the IM.51 According to a 
statement issued by India’s home minister, Bhatkal was arrested along with 
his associate Asadullah Akhtar (alias Tabrez) while “planning to meet in East 
Champaran area (near Raxaul), Bihar to plan/execute some terrorist acts.”52 
Other media reports, however, indicated that both of these terrorists were 
arrested in Nepal and deported to India. The Nepalese government has denied 
that the arrests occurred on its soil, while at the same time asserting that no 
anti-India activity would be allowed in Nepal.53 The confusion around the 
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exact location of the arrest notwithstanding, Bhatkal’s arrest provided the in-
telligence agencies with some new inputs regarding the operational dynamics 
of the IM organization. The NIA nevertheless has struggled to transform those 
inputs into tactical advantages against the outfit. It is not clear whether the 
huge workload of the NIA, which is in charge of a large number of terror 
incidents in addition to the IM’s activities, is taking a toll on the agency’s 
capacities.  
Increasing Polarization with Regard to the IM
The IM’s activities have increased the polarization of Indian politics along 
sectarian lines, with Muslim groups doubting the existence of the IM and 
Hindu groups calling for strict action against it. This political polarization has, 
to an extent, forced the security agencies to scale down the intensity of their 
investigations into the IM’s activities. 
The Urdu-language newspapers of India, some prominent Muslim organiza-
tions, and even some Indian national ministers continue to insist that there 
is no such thing as the IM. For example, an article in the October 2012 Milli 
Gazette, a Muslim magazine, said that the IM “is a fictitious organisation most 
possibly created by the Indian Intelligence Bureau to justify the repression 
and terrorisation of the Indian Muslim community in the name of fighting 
terror.”54 In October 2013, a number of Urdu newspapers and periodicals 
rejected reported linkages between the Muzaffarnagar riots and the explosions 
in Patna. Dismissing the conclusion that the IM could have been responsible 
for the explosion, one of these publications noted, “Political link of these 
blasts cannot be ruled out. In the past too, several blasts which were thought 
to have been perpetrated by Indian Mujahideen mercenaries were actually the 
handiwork of Hindutva terror groups. This fact must be kept in mind while 
investigating Patna blasts.”55
In July 2013, the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH), an Islamic organization in India, 
sent a letter to the general secretary of the ruling Congress Party insisting that 
Muslims of the country, particularly its educated class, feel that no organiza-
tion by the name of “ ‘Indian Mujahedeen’ exists in the country.”56 In the 
same month, K. Rahman Khan, the union minister for minority affairs, went 
on record to say that he’s skeptical that the IM exists because “nobody knows 
what it is, where it was formed, and who runs it.” “The Muslim community,” 
he continued, “is not buying its existence.”57 The political implications of such 
statements could have had a significant impact on the official policy of the 
Indian government. 
Indian Culture’s Apathy toward Counterterrorism Research
Although the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs and the intelligence agencies 
are largely insular institutions and fairly impervious to interventions from 
outside the country, the efforts they have made to delve deeper into the IM’s 
operations have been thwarted by a general cultural disinterest in strategic 
research. Research institutions and think tanks in India have often shied away 
from research on terrorism. In the absence of primary, field-based research—a 
dearth reflected by the fact that one lone book on the IM has been published 
so far—the ill-informed news media have dominated reporting on security 
issues. Known mostly to publish what the intelligence agencies feed them on 
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a regular basis, the Indian media’s pervasive lack of knowledge on the IM has 
been illustrated by news headlines that speculate on the future of the IM’s 
activities. Attributed to police sources, these headlines have ranged from the 
grand to the benign and include plans to detonate a “small nuclear bomb,”58 
hijack an aircraft,59 abduct politicians,60 and hire sharpshooters to kill BJP 
leader Narendra Modi.61 Some outlets have even published grandiloquent 
articles speculating that the IM might carry out a “9/11 type of attack.”62
The Prognosis
The threat from the IM could easily transform into a much larger menace if 
this terrorist juggernaut remains unaddressed both inside India and in coun-
tries like Pakistan, where key IM leaders are based. While arrests of IM cadres 
within India may provide temporary setbacks for the IM’s plan of action, 
its expanded presence in multiple Indian states makes it elimination-proof. 
Terrorist groups like the LeT are willing to play a supporting role to the IM, as 
long as the latter continues to inflame the Muslim-Hindu divide in India and 
batter the country with its hate and bombing campaigns. The year 2014 and 
beyond could prove to be important for the IM’s future, especially if instability 
in Afghanistan continues to fuel the capacities of Pakistan-based terrorist 
groups as well as the IM.     
The IM will maintain its status as the lead jihadist outfit in India in the time 
to come, unless India can focus on strengthening its current weak points: the 
NIA’s knowledge gap regarding the operational dynamics of the IM, political 
polarization regarding the IM, and a lack of in-depth research on the evolving 
threat of Islamist groups. v
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agent, military veteran, security contractor, and the ISFKM’s Australasia chief 
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arts background, fighting and surviving in hostile environments, and the 
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During my service, I held several positions, including section commander of 
the CTSO’s International Training Section, where I was responsible for devel-
oping and delivering counterterror, tactical-shooting, and Krav Maga training 
to Special Forces units from the United States and many other countries, 
preparing them for their combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. 
I was also a lead counterterror instructor on the Designated Hostage Rescue 
Take-Over Units Instruction Section, where I was in charge of training all 
of the IDF’s hostage rescue units. In addition, I was assigned to 
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counterterror warfare, tactical shooting, and Krav Maga, as well as 
training the CTSO instructors in those subject matters. In addi-
tion, I was a team leader on the operational counterterror unit 
during high-risk, direct-action, and CT missions throughout Gaza 
and the West Bank.
I completed my last term of service in the IDF approximately 
two years ago, and since then, I’ve been occupied with providing 
specialized training to various military and police organizations 
around the world. I’m also involved in special high-risk security 
and counterterror initiatives with various organizations. For one 
such initiative, I was recruited by a U.S. organization to be the 
team leader for a mission to rescue hostages being held captive on 
board vessels seized by pirates off the coast of Africa.
JOHNSTONE: What led you to this path? 
MAMAN: My entire family served in both military and police services, and it 
was the path I wanted to take since I was a young child.
JOHNSTONE: What originally influenced your decision to learn unarmed combat?
MAMAN: I began learning martial arts as a very young child. My father 
studied karate and judo as a young child and was a Krav Maga instructor 
during his service in the IDF, so I’ve always had an innate interest in the 
martial arts. In addition, growing up in Canada, I was bullied a lot during my 
school years and was determined to learn the skills I needed to defend myself, 
as well as defend others who were victims of violence.
JOHNSTONE: How long have you been in the martial arts, and what styles 
and systems have you previously trained in? 
MAMAN: I’ve been training in the martial arts for 30 years now. The two 
systems I have trained in that are still the predominant systems in my personal 
and professional lives are Krav Maga and Jeet Kune Do. In addition, I have 
trained very extensively in Hap Ki Do, American Kenpo karate, and WTF 
(World Taekwondo Federation) Tae Kwon Do, which I used to compete 
extensively in.
JOHNSTONE: You have served in both the military and the police. Can you 
tell me a bit about your background and experiences in both roles and how it 
has influenced your skills and knowledge as a well-respected instructor?
In the summer of 2006, the 
second Israel-Lebanon war 
broke out. I packed everything 
up in Canada, returned to Israel, 
and signed up for an additional 
three years of service in the IDF.
I was bullied a lot during 
my school years and was 
determined to learn the skills 
I needed to defend myself, as 
well as defend others who 
were victims of violence.
Israeli Defense Forces Forces returning 
from Lebanon,  August 2006.
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MAMAN: My background and experiences in both the Special Forces and 
policing are the primary influences that guide my knowledge and teachings as 
they relate to real-life survival. I have not only been involved in many engage-
ments and arrests with high-risk, violent terrorists and criminals but have also 
witnessed many violent attacks.
I have had the privilege to learn firsthand what the dynamics of real-life 
violence are about, and this has given me the ability to separate martial arts 
theories, which unfortunately are what practically every system and instructor 
out there teaches, from optimal, effective, real-life survival elements. 
JOHNSTONE: What are the most important skills and personal traits in your 
line of work?
MAMAN: In my line of work, the worst thing that can happen is when a 
subject we deal with decides to initiate a violent reaction to our actions against 
him. The majority of the subjects we deal with can’t afford to get caught and 
be locked up and are therefore willing to use maximum violence to escape or 
impede our ability to effect an arrest. This can mean ensuring we walk into an 
ambush if we approach the subject or the use of deliberate violence against us 
at the point of arrest.
Therefore, the most important traits in my line 
of work are solid mental focus and vigilance, and 
the ability to identify threatening indicators of 
a possible ambush or impending violence. This 
includes a thorough understanding of human 
behavior as it relates to body language and 
verbalization that can cue you to an individual’s 
true mental intentions. In addition, we have to 
be 100 percent capable in our physical/tactical 
skills, to ensure that we can explode into action 
with surgical precision at the first indication that 
a subject’s mental intention of violence manifests 
into physical action. We might be in a predica-
ment where we are facing a terrorist armed with 
a suicide bomb belt who has to do no more than 
depress a detonator, so we have to be focused and 
super quick.
JOHNSTONE: How often do you deal with real 
violence in your line of work?
MAMAN: Any professional who deals with 
violence and unfavorable human behavior on a 
regular basis will develop certain perceptions that 
the regular population does not possess. Dealing 
with violence in my line of work does not affect 
me emotionally or mentally. I’ve chosen this 
line of work because I know that if there are no 
warriors willing to stand up and face evil, then 
innocent people will get hurt and killed, and my 
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love and respect for the gift of life that we have all been given far outweighs 
the negativity of evil. If anything, given my constant interaction with violent 
individuals, I’ve simply become a lot more vigilant in ensuring my safety in 
my everyday life.
JOHNSTONE: Is it possible for you to leave work at work? 
MAMAN: It’s easy for me to leave the ugly side of my work at work. I have 
many great things in my personal life to keep me distracted, but the artistic 
side of my work is with me constantly. I’m always thinking of and trying new 
ways to perfect my tactical craft, to be better and more effective in my work. 
JOHNSTONE: How would you describe violence in real life? 
MAMAN: Unfortunately, the violence we see today is uglier. Both terrorists 
and criminals are far more desperate and relentless in attempting to achieve 
their objectives. It used to be that the threat of violence would be their choice 
of implement, but now they simply attack their victims with no warning or 
threats. In addition, both criminals and terrorists do not want to get caught, 
so they use maximum violence to ensure the fastest possible compliance from 
their victims or to ensure that they achieve maximum death, injury, and 
damage during an attack in minimal time.
JOHNSTONE: What are some indicators of impending violence? 
MAMAN: In almost every single violent attack situation, the subject displays 
indicators of their violent intentions. The majority of these indicators are 
presented through body language, which can include physical behavior or 
gestures that do not correspond with what the subject is verbalizing, such as a 
subject talking normally but standing in an aggressive stance or concealing a 
hand behind his back or in his clothing. Or a subject who is communicating 
with you but is constantly looking around in all directions. Usually when we 
interact with other people, our mental, visual, and verbal focus is directed 
at the individual we are interacting with. A subject constantly looking around 
while interacting with you is most likely ensuring that there are no other people 
around to witness or impede the ill-intended actions he is about to execute.
JOHNSTONE: What are some physical and mental responses when confronted 
with violence?
MAMAN: Physical and mental responses to violence vary a great deal from 
person to person. There are factors that come into play that will dictate how 
an individual will react, which include, first and foremost, the individual’s 
level of awareness of an impending violent attack. Unfortunately, many people 
in this world take on a complacent attitude toward survival and figure they 
can react to an attack in time. This generally fails.
When someone is overwhelmed by unexpected violence, they usually go 
into shock. Going into mental shock will make you physically freeze as well, 
so there is not much you can do until you recover mentally. If the attack is 
initiated with serious injury-inflicting violence, it may be too late by the time 
you recover.
JOHNSTONE: When did you officially commence ISFKM?
The artistic side of my work 
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always thinking of and trying 
new ways to perfect my 
tactical craft, to be better and 
more effective in my work.
In almost every single violent 
attack situation, the subject 
displays indicators of their 
violent intentions. The majority 
of these indicators are presented 
through body language.
Many people in this world 
take on a complacent attitude 
toward survival and figure 
they can react to an attack 
in time. This generally fails.
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MAMAN: ISFKM is the end result of my lifelong passion, dedication, and 
research into the science of surviving real-life violence, which is backed by my 
30 years of extensive unarmed combat and martial arts experience and over 15 
years of professional experience in the Special Forces, policing, and high-risk 
security fields.
The system, as it stands today, is the package I developed and delivered to 
all the U.S. Special Forces units at the Israeli Special Forces CTSO. The U.S. 
Special Forces, along with the SF units of many other allied countries, would 
come to the Israeli Special Forces CTSO for specialized counterterror warfare 
training before deploying to Iraq or Afghanistan. Generally, these units would 
be at our schoolhouse for as little as one week to as long as six weeks. I was the 
commander in charge of the CTSO’s International Training Section, and it was 
my responsibility to develop training programs that would ensure that these 
units could attain optimal real-life combat efficiency in very minimal training 
time. The ISFKM program I deliver today to civilian and law enforcement 
organizations is the exact same platform I delivered to the Israeli and other 
multinational Special Forces units.
JOHNSTONE: Why did you decide to call it Israeli Special Forces Krav Maga?
MAMAN: When I got out of the military and decided to teach my system on 
an official basis, I wasn’t too sure what to call it. My system is real military 
Krav Maga, unlike any of the civilian Krav Maga organizations out there. I 
wanted to give it a name that would first brand its identity as a true military/
SF system, and also identify its roots in real Krav Maga. Unfortunately, 
there are many Krav Maga organizations out there that do not teach the real 
military platform, and there are even more instructors and organizations out 
there that claim that what they teach is Krav Maga, when in fact it is not. 
So, joining the two terms of Israeli Special Forces and Krav Maga was the best 
solution I could come up with to brand our unique Krav Maga system.
JOHNSTONE: In what countries do you currently have instructors?
MAMAN: It’s been almost three years now since I kicked off the very first 
ISFKM instructor certification course, and presently, we have a team of instruc-
tors throughout the United States, Canada, Mexico, Europe, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia.
JOHNSTONE: What individuals have had the most influence on you as a 
martial artist?
MAMAN: There are several individuals throughout the course of my martial 
arts education who have influenced me. The first is my dad. He was an avid 
martial arts practitioner since his childhood and was also a Krav Maga in-
structor during his service in the Israeli Special Forces. Aside from everything 
that he taught me, listening to his many stories and experiences of combat 
during his service as a paratrooper gave me many lessons that I took with me 
when I first entered my service in the Israeli Special Forces, and which have 
guided me in my own experiences.
Next there is, of course, Imi Lichtenfeld, the founder of Krav Maga. Although 
I have never had the honor of meeting Imi in person, I am first of all grateful 
for his creation of Krav Maga, which has trained my mind and body to deal 
The ISFKM program I deliver 
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and other multinational 
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with many obstacles in my professional and personal lives. When you train in 
Krav Maga and realize just how intelligent and effective a system it is for real-
life survival, you can’t help but truly admire Imi’s work, especially for its time!
Then there’s Dave Lane. Dave was one of my instructors when I was growing 
up in Canada. He had over 40 years of experience in various martial arts, 
although American Kenpo was his predominant system. Dave was an indi-
vidual who absolutely loved the science of fighting and was an encyclopedia of 
information on the subject of real-life survival. Many of the lessons I learned 
from him still guide me today in my practice and teaching, and I still quote 
him and share many of his lessons in my teaching today.
JOHNSTONE: Over the past 10 years, there has been an explosion in the 
various types of “reality-based systems” and defensive tactics (DT) systems that 
have flooded the market. What are your views pertaining to these systems, 
and why?
MAMAN: Oh, boy. Yes, there definitely has been! It’s the natural progression of 
people following the trend of the season. This fad began immediately following 
9/11, when suddenly there was an overt consciousness about real-world threats 
and violence, the world’s militaries were in combat, Homeland Security was 
created in every country. Before you knew it, the same old martial artists, 
who once were on the covers of various martial arts magazines in judogis (the 
uniforms worn by Judo practitioners) teaching hip throws, were now on the 
exact same magazine covers, teaching the exact same hip throws, but only now 
they were wearing military fatigues and claiming that their hip throws were 
the new secret weapon of the world’s Special Forces units fighting in Iraq!
All I can tell you is that it’s important for people to realize that not everyone 
who served in the Special Forces necessarily knows how to teach people to 
survive, and not everyone who claims they were in the Special Forces really 
served in the Special Forces. It’s important to do your homework, ask a lot 
of questions, and verify people’s claims. And before you become a hard-core 
fan of a certain instructor or system, compare it to several others in the same 
category so you have a functional idea of what works and what doesn’t.
JOHNSTONE: You have been teaching realistic and no-nonsense DT and 
reality-based training for over 20 years, and you are regarded around the world 
as one of the founders of reality-based training. Yet, there have been several 
instructors who have entered the market in the United States over the past 
several years saying they were the first reality-based instructor. What are your 
thoughts about these types of claims, and has it affected your own system?    
MAMAN: To reiterate what I mentioned in my previous answer, there is no 
question that the martial arts field has more impostors than most other fields. 
For many people, the effectiveness of a self-defense system has to do with the 
grand perception it portrays. Many instructors feel that the more sensational 
the stories that surround their system are, the more effective their system 
actually will become.
I give nothing but credit to honest and dedicated people. Some of my most 
respected and influential instructors from whom I learned invaluable lessons 
about real-life survival never served as Special Forces soldiers or police officers. 
Over the past 10 years, there has 
been an explosion in the various 
types of “reality-based systems” 
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Let’s also understand that many of the RBSD (reality-based self-defense) system 
instructors out there are legitimate and excellent instructors and people.
It definitely bothers me when I know I worked very hard and put my time 
in to achieve the professional experience I did in my life, and I’m competing 
[professionally] with someone who didn’t put in a fraction of the effort, never 
served in the Special Forces, but adds the word Commando in front of his 
system, creates elaborate false claims of Special Forces service, and sells his 
system to military, police, and civilians under a false banner of credibility.
In the end, I believe that the best always rises to the top. I’m not afraid of 
legitimate competition, and I’m especially not worried about the frauds out 
there, because I know that what I have to offer is based on the best real-life 
experience, with a guarantee that what I teach will offer the average person 
a higher capability of surviving real-life violence over all other reality-based 
systems. Until today, the most dedicated members we have are the ones who 
trained in some of these other RBSD systems, because you can’t really know 
what good is until you’ve experienced the worst.
JOHNSTONE: What’s your opinion on the debate between sport-based and 
combat-oriented training systems?
MAMAN: I think everyone should do whatever it is that pleases them, as long 
as they do not mislead themselves. Sport is sport. It is designed for competi-
tive application and not for the street. Individuals should not go into sport-
oriented systems such as MMA (mixed martial arts) or grappling and walk 
around with a false sense of security that they will be efficiently capable of 
surviving real-life street violence.
As for the combat-oriented systems, again, this all depends on the instructor. 
As long as the instructor actually understands the true dynamics and realistic 
elements of uncoordinated, no-rules, ill-intended violence, then the system 
can justify the term combat-oriented.
JOHNSTONE: What is your opinion on the grappling craze that has seized the 
martial arts community in recent years, and what type of grappling is taught 
in ISFKM?
MAMAN: The grappling craze can be attributed to Royce Gracie in his first 
and subsequent victories in the early era of the UFC (Ultimate Fighting 
Championship). Royce most definitely proved to the martial arts world that 
there is a necessity for ground fighting, although the problem is that he did 
not quite delineate the way in which an individual has to fight on the ground 
for real-life survival.
Anybody who believes that sport-oriented grappling such as BJJ (Brazilian jiu-
jitsu), judo, and wrestling will suffice for the street should first hold their next 
grappling match on a concrete pavement with no protective gear. That should 
be enough to give you an understanding of the problems with rolling around 
on the street. If not, have your training partner deploy a knife while you are 
busy fighting for an arm bar.
In ISFKM, our only goal is 
real-life survival. We don’t 
fight with people, let alone 
grapple with them.
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In ISFKM, our only goal is real-life survival. We don’t fight with people, let 
alone grapple with them. Our goal is to terminate the threat as fast as possible 
to ensure our safety. What we do on the ground is the exact same thing we 
do standing up. We eliminate, very quickly, the attacker’s ability to function 
and bring more complex elements into the attack, such as weapons. What we 
do functions for small civilians the exact same way that it would for a soldier 
bearing battle equipment or a police officer in his or her duty belt.
JOHNSTONE: What is your opinion regarding the various Israeli DT systems 
that have spread throughout the world, and why are there differences and 
much conjecture between many of them and their authenticity?
MAMAN: There are two sides that you must be aware of when you’re talking 
about Israeli DT systems. First are Israeli systems that are actually part of the 
Israeli culture. These include Krav Maga, Hisardut, and Kapap. Krav Maga 
is the official, and the only, system of the IDF. Hisardut was developed by 
Dennis Hanover and has been part of the Israeli culture for many decades. 
And Kapap, led by Chaim Peer, is a commemorative movement, a tribute 
to the pre-Israel era of defensive training. Second are traditional martial arts 
systems represented by Israelis or hybrid systems created by Israelis. Again, 
some of these instructors are legitimate and talented individuals, while others 
are dishonest individuals trying to sell their homemade systems as official 
systems of the IDF or as false representations of Israeli Krav Maga.
JOHNSTONE: In your experience, what qualities do you need to see in a person 
before you know they are ready to be qualified as an instructor in ISFKM?
MAMAN: The ISFKM instructor certification course is open to individuals who 
are good people, no criminal records, have extensive martial arts/DT back-
grounds coupled with adequate teaching experience, and can demonstrate that 
they will be good ambassadors of the system and our organization.
JOHNSTONE: What are your current and future plans for ISFKM?
MAMAN: ISFKM is one element of our organization, CT 707 Israeli Krav Sys-
tems, Inc. CT 707 specializes in Israeli counterterror warfare, tactical shooting, 
and Krav Maga training. Our programs are highly regarded by many military 
and police organizations around the world. We have instructor certifications 
available for counterterror and active-shooter intervention as well as Israeli dy-
namic response shooting. As for ISFKM, we offer civilian, police, and military 
instructor certifications.
JOHNSTONE: It’s good to chat with you again, and thanks for your time, 
mate. We look forward to seeing you in Australia next year. 
MAMAN: Thank you, my friend, and I look forward to visiting you guys 
in 2015. v
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The military use of drones receives significant public attention, 
particularly regarding their technological advantages and combat superiority. 
While the many advantages of this new military technology are important 
for modern combat and other operations, the use of drones on the battlefield 
raises some questions unique to the men and women in uniform who pilot 
them. U.S. military personnel are trained to adhere to a code of conduct 
known as the Professional Military Ethic (PME). For personnel who operate 
remote weapons, this code can pose an ethical dilemma because the pilot’s 
individual autonomy is constrained by the capabilities of the machines he or 
she controls.1
This discussion looks at the conflicts that arise for the remotely piloted vehicle 
(RPV) pilot who is serving in roles that do not apparently require the tradi-
tional core military virtues. At first glance, there may be perceived emotional 
benefits to using RPVs in battle; a drone, after all, is not subject to the range 
of sensations and emotions faced by a soldier2 on the ground. That is not to 
say that its use is devoid of moral implication, however. What, then, are the 
effects of piloting a drone on the military professional who is far removed 
from the battlespace and yet operating within it? 
The sheer number of drones now in use demonstrates their perceived utility, 
and drones are affecting the way policy makers and soldiers think about and 
conduct the spectrum of military operations. The United States military now 
has nearly 150 times as many drones as it did just a decade ago.3 It is well 
worth exploring, then, what impact the radically expanded use of this still-
young technology has on those personnel who pilot drones, and on the pilots’ 
understanding of war. These lessons, while drawn from U.S. experience, could 
easily be expanded, mutatis mutandis,4 to every armed force that uses or is 
contemplating the use of drones in military operations.
While all branches of the U.S. military are becoming increasingly reliant on 
RPVs to put more physical distance between soldiers and the battlefield, it re-
mains true that first and foremost, a military unit is composed of individuals. 
It is still individual soldiers who accomplish mission objectives. We see evi-
dence of this in the organizational literature of the U.S. armed services, which 
guides all of their uniformed members. The “Soldier’s Creed” of the U.S. 
Army and the “Airman’s Creed” of the U.S. Air Force, for example, illustrate 
the central role of the fighter and the absolutist philosophy that is instilled in 
him or her at boot camp, the service academies, and other training venues for 
the services.5 These documents set out fundamental expectations—a warrior 
ethic. Such an ethic includes (but is not limited to) loyalty to the mission, 
prohibitions on accepting defeat and providing information to the enemy, a 
requirement for unwavering support for other members of the team according 
to traditional standards, and the defense of freedom and justice. In short, 
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the guidance emphasizes that one must be brave in all military endeavors on 
behalf of the nation. This leaves us with a pressing question for the soldier 
assigned to engage in combat through drones: How does operating a weapon 
thousands of miles from the battlespace correlate with the seemingly inherent 
requirement for the warfighter to honor traditional elements of the warrior ethic? 
The Unique Obligations of a Soldier
Any soldier who has physically been in battle has experienced “the fog of war.” 
Overcoming this confusion requires strong leadership and a heavy reliance on 
basic military principles and values.6 Among these are the virtues traditionally 
attributed to the warfighter, including the virtues that are qualities of char-
acter—being a good soldier requires a good character. Consider the virtue of 
bravery. Simply acting bravely is not sufficient; the soldier must also develop 
the proper character that will guide his or her emotions through being given 
opportunities to practice being brave.7 It is hard to imagine how soldiers can 
maintain a virtue such as bravery while they are physically removed from the 
battlespace. The use of drones and other semi-autonomous or autonomous 
weapons should cause us to examine whether we need to differently frame 
traditional military training methods. Where should the armed services place 
the emphasis in military ethics training and professional military education to 
ensure that warriors are the most effective ethical practitioners possible?
To answer this question, we must first review military ethics in general. Mem-
bers of the U.S. military, for example, have a distinct obligation to the society 
and citizens they serve and defend.8 Like all military personnel, they are 
trained to follow established procedures and policies. In combat, a soldier’s 
decisions are primarily aimed at benefiting his or her own side. The soldier’s 
decision process also must, secondarily, consider factors such as proportion-
ality and discrimination—principles that will provide some benefit (or at least 
minimize harm) to the other side. Taken alone, policy and procedure will not 
serve as adequate tools for a soldier operating in-theater to navigate through 
the “fog of war”; rather, ethical considerations play just as vital a role in 
evaluating and selecting courses of action.  
In war, the “right thing to do” is guided by unity of command, which re-
quires, among other things, unity of effort—that is, coordination and cooper-
ation among all elements that comprise the forces employed to accomplish the 
desired outcome or goal.9 It is important to note that such a structure expects 
that the soldiers who make up the unified command must willingly accept the 
goal of the mission as justified. In a democracy, it is not the role of the soldier, 
or even the commander of the unified force, to determine the goal of the mis-
sion. Rather, it is the obligation of the civilian government to articulate the 
moral justification for entering war, the jus ad bellum, in the planning phase.
The U.S. fighter maintains responsibility for his or her decision and actions 
according to jus in bello, the laws of war that apply to the actual conduct of 
operations in armed conflict. In traditional combat, soldiers operate physi-
cally in the theater of the war effort. Even bomber pilots who operate from 
the apparent safety and considerable distance of the sky are still working 
in-theater and assume some level of risk associated with their specific mission. 
The hardships of war are experienced by a cross-functional and integrated 
team of individuals working together within the battlespace. Thus, the more 
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technology removes the soldier from the battlespace, the harder it becomes for 
that soldier to adhere to the traditional PME. How can one individual meet 
the obligation to be brave and loyal to other team members while personally 
removed from any apparent physical harm? 
In his book, Kantian Thinking about Military Ethics, J. Carl Ficarrotta explores 
how soldiers are morally bound while acting in war, and whether their moral 
obligations exceed those of ordinary citizens.10 He suggests that if we under-
stand the function of the military in a narrow sense to be to fight on behalf of 
the nation, then soldiers are held to a higher moral standard while executing 
this function. His reasons are threefold: first, the operational complexity 
and cooperation required by warfare demand strict adherence to a code of 
ethics; second, the requirement that soldiers demonstrate “bravery, selfless-
ness, and conscientiousness” while carrying out their duties calls for a clear 
moral code; and third, failure to successfully execute a military operation may 
result in exceptionally dire outcomes.11 Each of these reasons underscores the 
importance of unity of effort to maintain unity of command. It is not clear 
that reliance solely on the military’s PME and leadership will produce the right 
result from the soldier confronted with the execution of a tactical objective in 
the battlespace.12 
Trust and integrity within the military unit are foundational principles on 
which the team functions. The obligations of soldiers are obligations of 
solidarity; that is, they are particular to the armed service and impose require-
ments on members beyond mere consent.13 To accomplish the set of missions 
determined by national leadership, a soldier must be loyal to the military 
organization and fellow military members. But what happens when loyalty 
to the mission requires a soldier to betray her loyalty to a fellow member of 
the military? The drone pilot cannot aid her fellow soldiers who are physically 
in the battlespace as she would be able to if she were on-scene. Her agency is 
limited to the capabilities of the drone. If a drone pilot observes through her 
monitor an act of violence in the battlespace against soldiers on her own side, 
she may retaliate against the enemy by firing the drone’s weapons. Her range 
of action is limited, however; she cannot physically come to their aid and offer 
medical care, or help remove a wounded fellow warrior from the battlefield.
The difficulty that I am pointing out is a dissonance for the drone pilot 
between the justification to act that she receives from her branch of the service 
and her obligation to treat others fairly. In the first place, the RPV pilot is lim-
ited in her ability to carry out the physical expectations set forth in training 
and the traditional PME. In the second place, as a result of this limitation on 
her ability to act within the battlespace, the pilot is in some sense restricted 
from honoring the principle of unity of effort as she has been trained to do. 
That is, she may be put in a situation where she cannot come to the aid of a 
member or members of her own side because her on-scene agency is restricted 
to the capabilities of the drone. I argue that this creates an unacceptable moral 
dilemma for the RPV pilot. Her military training and guiding ethical prin-
ciples—the PME—tell her to be brave at all costs and to stay with her team 
during a mission, even if she is in great peril. However, her assignment places 
a physical boundary between her and the battlespace that utterly precludes her 
from doing so.14
The pilot is in some sense 
restricted from honoring the 
principle of unity of effort as 
she has been trained to do. 
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The military’s role has expanded 
far beyond preparing for and 
fighting traditional wars, but 
military culture still revolves 
around these virtues.
This reality makes it morally problematic to align how the PME is directing 
the soldier to carry out her assignment with a role that limits her on-scene 
agency. If my argument here is correct, this disconnect has the potential to 
raise a seemingly unmanageable internal conflict for the drone pilot and 
could, in the worst case, lead to a breakdown of unity of effort by threatening 
the fundamental tenets of unity of command and the broader PME. In the 
next section, I go into more detail on just how this conflict may play out for 
the RPV pilot, and the problems this creates for the PME.
The Conflict: Military v. Individual Virtue
When we think of an ideal member of the armed services, there are specific 
attributes and values that readily come to mind such as courage, bravery, 
persistence, and integrity, to name only a few. Each of these virtues can be 
tied directly to the primary mission of the military professional: to serve as a 
warfighter. 
Although the role of the modern military has expanded far beyond preparing 
for and fighting traditional interstate wars, the culture of the military still 
revolves around these kinds of virtues. Core values, and the methods that 
many armed services utilize in training to instill them, focus on the central 
idea that, as a soldier, you are not in the fight alone: you function as a part of 
a team of highly competent and trained individuals to execute the mission. The 
concepts of unity of command and unity of effort are of critical importance in 
this context. My concern is that the further one departs from the traditional 
model of unity of effort, the more difficult any justifications for unity of 
command become.15 The central moral point that appears to support the use 
of RPVs is that to conduct a just war, a soldier is expected to discriminate be-
tween combatants and non-combatants so as to deliberately target only those 
who are combatants. Proponents of RPVs insist that use of the technology in 
this case increases the morality of war because drone strikes are potentially 
more precise than other suitable weaponry, and hit what or who they are 
aimed at.16 The consistency of such technology, in their view, directly trans-
lates into increased military effectiveness 
and the ethical soundness required by 
jus in bello.
Unity of command, however, requires 
unity of effort. When I am directly 
in the physical presence of my team 
while fighting from a trench or the 
flight deck of an aircraft carrier, a 
sense of belonging and camaraderie 
arises through the shared history and 
experience that surround the mission. 
Thus, there is strong support for me to 
undertake a proportional role in the 
conflict, knowing that the others are 
doing so as well. Because the RPV pilot 
does not have this shared experience, it 
is possible to question whether he or she 
can truly act on behalf of fellow soldiers 
in the same way that someone next to 
U.S.  Air Force Senior Airman Cristobal 
Galindo watches a video feed from 
an RQ-12 Predator unmanned 
aerial vehicle during an operation 
near Spin Boldak, Afghanistan.
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The pilot relinquishes some 
authority to the drone. She 
has no capacity in which to 
display physical bravery.
Military personnel engaged 
in combat must possess the 
cognitive and emotional tools 
to make timely decisions.
me in the trench or overhead in a fighter jet can. As Martin Cook writes, pro-
portionality (and, I would contend, all jus in bello moral principles) is “highly 
contextual and depend[s] on many dimensions of practical military reality.”17 
One of these practical realities is the shared physical battlespace in which 
soldiers fight. When this is lost due to the removal of some military operators 
from the theater, it is natural to infer that the virtues of the warrior ethic that 
are in part dependent on that practical reality could be lost along with it.
The focus of the traditional PME is on the empirical realm: a soldier is a part 
of a team, and this knowledge enables the soldier to recognize and understand 
the limits of his own authority. Choosing the right course of action is at least 
partially based on the justification for the method of action; for example, 
using violence to stop violence by another. A soldier on the ground can dem-
onstrate physical and moral bravery and loyalty. He can exercise his authority 
as an autonomous agent while on-scene. An RPV pilot cannot behave in the 
same way. As I pointed out earlier, the pilot relinquishes her authority, at least 
in some sense, to the drone. She has no capacity in which to display physical 
bravery, and may have little opportunity to display moral bravery. She cannot 
act in the same fully autonomous way as the soldier on the ground because 
she is physically absent from the battlespace, and consequently free from all 
risks of physical harm. Further, because a solid foundation in the virtues of 
military conduct requires opportunities to practice them, it seems difficult to 
assume that the drone pilot will reliably execute them. 
I am not proposing that we do away with the use of drones—such a notion is 
equally impractical and undesirable. Rather, we must consider how we should 
equip and train the pilots who operate them to handle the cognitive dis-
sonance that emerges between the traditional PME and an operational envi-
ronment that obviates the need to exercise at least some of the fundamental 
military virtues. As militaries continue to incorporate remotely operated 
technology, I perceive a new obligation for military training and the PME. 
A Proposal for the PME
The U.S. military’s current approach to training and education is focused on 
the mind-set of a soldier in battle. This includes what fighters’ obligations are 
to those on their own side: “Every soldier must have the potential to act like 
a warrior if only once in their life, whether they are support personnel who 
face the danger of improvised explosive devices … or mechanics huddling in 
shelters as mortars explode around them.”18 The traditional PME therefore 
is not adequate to guide the reactions of RPV pilots who operate completely 
remote from the battlespace. The challenge lies in how to modify the PME so 
that it can accommodate this new combat reality.
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Uncovering this problem has been my primary aim. While a full exploration 
of potential solutions is beyond the scope of this article, the concept of virtue 
epistemology (VE) could potentially address this inadequacy, at least in part. 
Using VE, the individual does not seek to justify an action based on a set of 
external principles; instead, he or she evaluates when and whether to act based 
on intellectual “virtues and vices.” Virtues in this case refer to the qualities of 
careful, informed reasoning that serve as the basis of good moral character and 
lead to reliable, true beliefs. Vices include jumping to conclusions, or clinging 
to an idea in the face of disproving facts. These intellectual virtues and vices 
are fundamental concepts of self-evaluation that are meant to be practically 
useful in the face of a moral dilemma.19 The aim of VE is to promote intellec-
tual and ethical well-being for agents who are faced with a difficult choice or 
situation. Examples include acknowledging that they do not know something 
or recognizing that they are unable to physically act.
It is essential that all military personnel who are actively engaged in a combat 
operation possess the necessary cognitive and emotional tools to make timely 
decisions that are justifiable according to the dynamic circumstances and 
information available as the situation unfolds. At first glance, the inclusion of 
intellectual virtues in military ethical training looks promising because it ap-
pears to address two of the most pressing problems faced by RPV pilots. First, 
the “fog of war” problem can be mitigated by applying such virtues as open-
mindedness and what Aristotle called phronesis, or practical wisdom, which 
support the unity of effort that is vital to the military in combat operations.20 
Second, intellectual virtues allow RPV pilots to more fully recognize the limits 
of their agency and avoid applying amoral (faulty) beliefs to justify their moral 
position. 
For example, when the RPV pilot cannot physically assist an injured fellow 
soldier, her ability to rely on her own intellectual virtues of informed rea-
soning may help the pilot understand her epistemic duty. Just as conflicts may 
arise between the moral virtues (e.g., do moral ends justify immoral means?), 
similar conflicts may arise between the intellectual and moral virtues (e.g., I 
know I have no means to act, but my moral virtue demands that I physically 
act). Open-mindedness helps the RPV pilot to be receptive to new ideas: e.g., 
recognizing the limits on her agency that prevent her from demonstrating 
moral bravery and finding other means to help, such as requesting assistance 
from another unit on the battlefield.
At this point, an overarching intellectual virtue, practical wisdom, comes into 
play. This quality of intellect allows the pilot to consider all of the moral and 
intellectual virtues involved in her choices. Practical wisdom allows the pilot 
to understand the totality of the situation and assess the practical thing to do, 
Among the traditional virtues 
of honor, loyalty, bravery, and 
so on, there must be room to 
reinforce the intellectual virtues 
without interfering with the 
discipline that supports unity of 
command and unity of effort.
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while recognizing that the morally brave and the open-minded choices come 
into conflict. Having considered all of the factors, the pilot can then make the 
decision that a reasonable person would make (calling for help and waiting for 
it to arrive); she can justify her choice by evaluating the general motivation for 
good in all of the virtues involved and picking out those virtues that best fit 
the unique situation.
Despite the potential benefits of VE and the intellectual virtues for military 
training, the proposal presents some significant problems that must be 
addressed. The first problem is implementation. Without adequate funding, 
training resources, and time for personnel to attend training in VE decision 
making, the project will remain in the world of ideas. The difficulties of 
implementation will be compounded by the need to deliver VE training to the 
broad spectrum of the military workforce, from entry-level recruits to senior 
officers. Multiple training programs will have to be developed and imple-
mented to target the cognitive skill levels, needs, and roles of such disparate 
groups of students. In the case of the U.S. military and most other military 
organizations, if the military leadership acknowledges the need for better 
cooperation and collaboration among personnel in combat operations, this 
need must be made apparent to those government officials responsible for the 
funding of military education.
A deeper problem consists of educating military personnel in the intellectual 
virtues while maintaining the battlefield-oriented PME that has been a time-
honored part of military tradition and culture. Among the traditional virtues 
of honor, loyalty, bravery, and so on, there must be room to reinforce the 
intellectual virtues without interfering with the discipline that supports unity 
of command and unity of effort. If RPV pilots are expected to know what they 
ought to do during an operation, then they must be able to explore alterna-
tives, apply careful reasoning, and remain focused on the ultimate objective 
of the current mission. The difficulty lies in balancing the ability of RPV pilots 
to adhere to their orders and required operational protocols while providing 
opportunities for them to acknowledge and justify the limits imposed on their 
personal autonomy.
In actual combat, there is often little or no time for advanced preparation. 
Therefore, a rules-based approach to moral problems is warranted. The 
objective of training and the PME is to create a clear policy for the individual 
soldier to follow in a wide range of physically and 
morally difficult circumstances. One advantage of VE 
is that intellectual virtues—the qualities of a careful 
and competent thinker—rather than physical ones 
such as bravery under fire, serve as the foundation of 
epistemic evaluation. 
Aristotle distinguished virtues of character to be 
those of one who is well tempered and wise: this state 
of mind allows him or her to reason and act in an 
appropriate way.21 RPV pilots must be able to draw 
on well-established intellectual virtues to navigate 
through the “fog of war” in a way that acknowledges 
the limits of their agency while they aim to act 
according to the truth of whatever situation they are 
The difficulty lies in balancing 
the ability of RPV pilots to 
adhere to their orders and 
required operational protocols 
while providing opportunities 
for them to acknowledge and 
justify the limits imposed on 
their personal autonomy.
A U.S.  Air Force captain works 
the controls of a Predator drone 
aircraft from the “cockpit” 
room at Kandahar Airfield.
51
May 2014
operating in. Since soldiers already (presumably) possess virtues of character 
that guide them to act in a reasonable way, it seems a natural progression to 
educate them in the intellectual virtues. Using appropriate reasoning will 
allow soldiers, including RPV pilots, to critically examine and develop a clearer 
picture of the circumstances that have given rise to a moral dilemma. v
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The first thing that we 
learned was communication 
and how we should work 
closely with our personnel. 
This is really helpful for us.
I have had bad experiences 
in the past, when our ODAs 
or our personnel were in 
contact with the enemy and we 
couldn’t support them in time.
This interview is taken from the collection of the Combating Terrorism 
Archive Project (CTAP).1 On 13 November 2013, CTAP co-director Leo 
Blanken spoke with an Afghan Special Forces officer, who asked to remain 
anonymous.2 
LEO BLANKEN: Tell me about any lesson learned that you think would 
benefit the global SOF community.  
OFFICER: I have been working shoulder to shoulder with U.S. forces for 
more than five years. I have been training with them. This is really good, but 
sometimes we should review our actions: what we did in the past and what 
we will do in the future. There are some things that we have learned and some 
things that we still have problems with, like our communications, our chain 
of command, our command and control—this kind of stuff. 
Because I am working closely with American forces, the first thing I learned 
is how we should support our ODAs (Operational Detachments–Alpha) and 
our personnel in the field. It is really good for me to learn now, as an officer, 
what I should do in the future with my ODAs, my personnel, my soldiers, and 
NCOs. The first thing that we learned was communication and how we should 
work closely with our personnel. This is really helpful for us. The second thing 
that we have had a problem with is our forces and our supply. We have [logis-
tical] issues and the Afghan National Security Forces are not supplying us on 
time. We also sometimes have problems with our communications—how we 
should communicate with our ODAs and personnel in the field.
When they are in contact with the enemy, we have to focus on how we should 
help them. Sometimes it’s really hard. I have had bad experiences in the 
past, when our ODAs or our personnel were in contact with the enemy and 
we couldn’t support them in time. One time we had five WIAs (wounded in 
action). In that case, it was really, really bad because they were wounded in an 
IED explosion. It was during the night. We were unable to send Afghan air-
craft because they can’t fly during the night, so we sent our forces—infantry, 
vehicles, a convoy. They arrived near the AO (area of operations), but the AO 
was completely covered by enemy IEDs. Our wounded guys were waiting 
more than nine hours for us to help them. Unfortunately, we lost two NCOs 
in that case. There were three more who were still alive into the early morning, 
when our forces, our ODAs, cleared the AO and the roads, and we were able to 
help them. It was hard, because each soldier or NCO or officer wants to serve 
his country, his people—but in [an emergency] situation, we can’t help them 
out. It is really bad. These are issues that we have problems with, especially 
logistical support, our quick reaction force support, this kind of thing.  
BLANKEN: I wanted to ask about an interesting comment you made earlier, 
about the dog tags.  
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If I should be in command 
and have the power, one of 
the first issues I would want 
to effect is our dog tags.
OFFICER: Oh, yes. Unfortunately, in our Special Operations brigade, or divi-
sion, we don’t have dog tags. I learned about them from the U.S. personnel 
over the past five years, and I requested from my generals, my command, that 
we [Afghan Special Forces] should have dog tags. Sometimes, when we want 
to go to the field, we know there are IEDs, and if we don’t have dog tags, it is 
a very big problem for us. There was one experience I had that was really bad. 
There were three NCOs in a Humvee hit by an IED explosion. We lost one 
guy, and the other two were wounded. One of these wounded guys was now 
back here in the hospital: “This is Joe (for example), and this is his registration 
number.” After one hour, unfortunately, we lost him—he died in the hospital. 
I sent his body back to our division with the name of Joe and just a number. 
After two days, they told me, “Hey, he is not Joe, and this number is wrong.” 
He didn’t have a dog tag, and no one knows who he was because he was 90% 
burned. No one is able to confirm who he was. If I should be in command and 
have the power, one of the first issues I would want to effect is our dog tags. 
I would be really happy to help my soldiers, NCOs, and officers back in the 
field because it is my job. The guys who are in command or in high posi-
tions—they have to help me. I already requested that we get dog tags. Maybe 
I should request it again—our Ministry of Defense or Special Operations 
division should have dog tags as soon as possible for the personnel, because we 
are just 10,000 people. v 
NOTES
1 The Combating Terrorism Archive Project aims to collect and 
archive knowledge on strategy, operations, and tactics used by 
military and other security personnel from around the world 
in the twenty-first-century fight against global terrorism. 
Collectively, the individual interviews that CTAP conducts will 
create an oral history archive of knowledge and experience in 
counterterrorism for the benefit of the CT community now and 
in the future.
2 This interview was edited for length and clarity. Every effort 
was made to ensure that the meaning and intention of the 
participants were not altered in any way. The ideas and opinions 
of all participants are theirs alone and do not represent the 
official positions of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, the 
U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. government, or any other 
official entity. 
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Mercy, I’m discovering, has 
become a complicated subject, 
particularly in armed conflict.
There is nothing further, the 
medic tells the captain, that he 
can do for the man. The captain 
pauses a moment and then 
discharges a pistol round into 
the man, instantly killing him.
I have been thinking lately about mercy and the limitations we 
put on who can render it and who can receive it, and whether those limita-
tions can ever be morally justified.  Mercy, I’m discovering, has become a 
complicated subject, particularly in armed conflict. But should it be? Con-
sider, for example, the two cases I describe here.  
In the first case, a NATO platoon in Afghanistan engages in a high-speed 
pursuit of a vehicle fleeing a city checkpoint. The driver of the vehicle has 
refused repeated orders to stop, and since the car is believed to be carrying a 
high-value enemy leader, the platoon, as ordered, fires on the vehicle, causing 
it to crash into a wall. The surviving occupants of the car immediately flee 
into the neighborhood. As the platoon approaches the vehicle, the soldiers 
discover the driver still inside, mortally wounded by a round that tore away 
part of his skull. The platoon medic pulls the driver, who is barely alive, from 
the car, assesses his condition, and informs his young captain that the driver 
“isn’t going to make it.” There is nothing further, the medic tells the captain, 
that he can do for the man. The captain, looking at the driver, who is gurgling 
up blood into the dirt of the road and clearly suffering, pauses a moment and 
then discharges a pistol round into the man, instantly killing him. He does so, 
he will later testify at his court martial, to put the driver out of his misery. It 
was, he will say, “the right and honorable thing to do.”
The entire incident is caught on video, and the young captain—allegedly an 
exemplary officer and religiously devout soldier—is subsequently brought up 
on charges of murder and is eventually convicted by the military court. In the 
verdict, he is found guilty of the lesser charge of involuntary manslaughter 
and immediately dismissed from military service. He is not sentenced to any 
prison time.
Whenever I’ve introduced this case to my students, their reactions have been 
uniformly unsympathetic to the captain. Typical responses have ranged from 
“He clearly violated the rules of engagement” and “Who is he to play God?” 
to “If he feels sympathy for the enemy, he’s sick!” Almost all have agreed that 
the captain must serve some prison time, to set an example for other military 
members who may be tempted to indulge similar feelings and actions. A 
significant number have doubted whether the captain, as a true military 
professional, could truly feel mercy for the enemy at all.  
I understand there are both long-standing international laws of armed conflict 
and sections of the numerous international codes of military justice—in 
addition to the rules of engagement that existed at the time—that forbid the 
young captain’s actions, regardless of whether they were motivated by genuine 
human compassion. I’ve also inferred from my students’ responses that such 
mercy has no place when it comes to the enemy. So let’s say for argument’s 
sake that I get all that. And then let’s consider a second hypothetical case.
George Lober teaches ethics and 




Typical responses have ranged 
from “He clearly violated the 
rules of engagement” and 
“Who is he to play God?” 
to “If he feels sympathy for 
the enemy, he’s sick!”
 You realize that although you 
cannot rescue him, you could 
with one shot kill your captured 
friend and spare him the terrible 
suffering he is about to endure.
Imagine that you and three others of your unit are being overrun by a 
much larger, although less well-armed, enemy force in a mountainous area 
of Afghanistan. You are essentially surrounded, and evasion and escape are 
impossible. However, the four of you are holed up in a location where the 
only way the enemy can reach you is to assault your position in human waves, 
and they have started to launch such attacks at you. You’ve radioed for close 
air support and rescue, but you’re told such support is not available for various 
reasons and likely won’t arrive for another 24 to 48 hours. You’re told you’ll 
have to hold out and repel the attacks yourselves. Your group has enough am-
munition for the moment, provided you use it sparingly, and the four of you 
have been able to turn the assaults back, although some have broken into your 
position and resulted in intense hand-to-hand combat. Finally, in one assault, 
a member of your group is taken alive by the retreating enemy and pulled into 
their main force. There is no doubt that the enemy’s objective is to kill you all. 
There is also no doubt that any attempt to rescue your friend will be met with 
a storm of weapon fire that will result in your immediate death. From your 
position, as you look down upon the enemy, you see that your friend, now 
badly beaten, has been brought to an open area where it becomes obvious the 
enemy fighters intend to mutilate him to death within your sight.  
You realize that although you cannot rescue him, you could with one shot 
kill your captured friend and spare him the terrible suffering he is about to 
endure. As though sensing your dilemma, your friend raises his head and 
looks at your protected position. Should you take the shot to mercifully spare 
him the pain he is about endure? If you do, is that murder?
When I recently presented the second case to my students and asked them 
the above questions, they responded almost overwhelmingly that (1) yes, they 
should take the shot; (2) if they were the captured prisoner, they would want 
one of their group to shoot and spare them from torture; and (3) no, that is 
not murder, that is a mercy killing. One particular student, however, a deeply 
religious colonel who had been fighting terrorists in his country for over 20 
years, offered the opinion that if one truly believes in a God and a divine 
plan, then only God should determine the time and manner of the captured 
colleague’s death. “Who are you,” he asked his fellow students, “to interfere in 
that plan?” The question brought a silence to my class and actually changed a 
couple of students’ minds.
Setting the spiritual implications of the colonel’s remarks aside, I confess that 
I’m inclined to agree with the majority of my students on all fronts. But what 
is it about the two cases, I wonder, that makes the one decision appear mor-
ally questionable at best and the other feel morally right? I admit that I’m not 
sure. I want to believe it’s not just that we selectively restrict the giving and 
receiving of a final act of mercy to those like ourselves, and deny it for others. 
And I certainly recognize that there are codified laws of conflict to prevent 
the summary execution of captives, detainees, and unarmed, non-threatening 
combatants under the captor’s false pretense of rendering mercy. Yet the two 
cases still strike me as disturbingly similar. Both involve the unavoidable 
suffering and imminent death of a human being under humiliating, dishon-
orable circumstances; both involve an unarmed and defenseless combatant/
captive; and if the young captain in the first case is perceived to be sincere, 
then the decision to shoot in both instances draws on a sense of compassion. 
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If intentions matter, it would seem that both cases come close to suggesting 
that the act of killing in each circumstance would be an act of virtue. Why 
then the difference in reactions from my students? What is it about the first 
case that troubles so many of the professional service members I teach, and 
what is it that allows them to accept the second killing as morally justified?  
Again, I don’t know the answers, but I suspect the difference may lie in the 
circumstances. In the first case, the platoon captain appears to be making a 
personal judgment on the appropriate “honorable” circumstances under which 
a fellow human being should die. Who is he, my students may be asking, to 
determine what those circumstances are, or whether that individual’s actual 
moment of dying is in fact imminent, or that his last moments have no 
personal value? In this case, their sentiments may well be closely aligned with 
the religious colonel’s. It may well be part of some divine plan for that enemy 
driver to die writhing in the dirt road—it could even be what that driver 
deserves according to divine judgment. Furthermore, there are laws to prevent 
his being shot. By these criteria, then, the right thing to do is to leave him 
there to die in his own time.
In the second case, again I don’t know for sure, but I suspect that the shooting 
of the captured teammate could assume the dimension of both a rescue and 
a final act of loyalty. Unable to physically rescue the captured friend, the final 
act of loyalty could be seen as a duty to spare him further unnecessary agony 
at the hands of those who would cruelly inflict it until his inevitable death. 
If that’s so, I believe most of my students could see the two cases as distinctly 
different. The degree to which they would be interfering in some divine 
plan—if they even considered that an issue, and many of them don’t—might 
not matter as much as their perceived obligation to act as a loyal brother-in-
arms to a friend in peril. In cases like the second one, that loyalty, I suspect, 
trumps other moral considerations.
Such a conclusion, though, demands that we ask ourselves whether we restrict 
such acts of mercy only to those to whom we feel loyal. I’m uncomfortable with 
that implication, just as I’m uncomfortable with the question that someone 
occasionally has asked: What if, in the first case, by unfortunate circumstance, 
the individual dying in the street was a fellow member of the platoon instead of 
an enemy driver? Would I hesitate to condemn the apparently compassionate 
captain if he shot his dying companion because it was “the right and honorable 
thing to do”? My gut says, “No, I can see where that would be wrong.” How 
then, you may ask, is that different from the second case? Good question.  
One final aspect to consider in these cases is the matter of consent. Neither 
the driver in the first case, nor the friend in the second, is capable of giving 
his explicit consent to be killed. Yet the shooter in both cases is inferring that 
death is what those men would prefer. I’m generally uncomfortable with that 
inference. To act on what you think other people would want when it comes 
to ending their life seems presumptuous and dangerous. At the same time, I’m 
also strongly sympathetic. I know if I were the friend being tortured in the 
second case, I’d definitely want you to pull the trigger.
Mercy, as I said at the beginning of this essay, is complicated. Maybe that’s 
because it should be. v 
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The Great Game:  The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia
MAJ Wesley “Matt” Spear,  
U.S. Army
Understanding the present-day conditions and ongoing struggles 
for political and economic clout in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and other Central 
Asian countries requires understanding the region’s past and the role that 
external actors have played in Central Asia’s development. In his non-fiction 
book, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, author Peter 
Hopkirk utilizes an impressive anthology of autobiographies, biographies, and 
contemporary accounts to describe the events and figures involved in the late 
nineteenth-century struggle for dominance in Central Asia by imperial powers 
Russia and Great Britain. This period of history was coined the “Great Game” 
by Captain Arthur Conolly and made famous in popular culture by Rudyard 
Kipling’s novel Kim.1 The two sides officially called a truce when they signed 
the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, but the geopolitical effects of the 
Great Game continue to this day.
Hopkirk’s book begins in the pre-Russian state of Kievan Rus’, which came 
under Mongol attack during the early thirteenth century. The utter destruc-
tion the Mongols left behind and the Russians’ struggle to expel not only 
the Mongol invaders but Swedish and German armies of conquest as well 
was a main impetus behind the Russian tsars’ drive to acquire more territory 
as a buffer. Russia’s insatiable appetite for new lands to the south inevitably 
brought the Russian Empire and the British Empire into a nineteenth-century 
precursor to the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. A shadow war of spying, espionage, 
and sometimes-lethal engagements emerged as the two sides fought for influ-
ence in territories that spanned from the Caucasus Mountains in the west to 
the Chinese empire in the east. As Russia’s armies advanced closer to British 
India, the British often felt compelled to respond in force to prevent their 
sphere of influence from being threatened. Both sides employed a mixture of 
military officers, political agents, and explorer-spies to spy on the other, map 
and research uncharted lands, and try to make friends with powerful indig-
enous leaders in hopes of forming political alliances to counter the advances 
of the other. As Hopkirk notes,
Certain areas were judged too perilous, or politically sensitive, for 
Europeans to venture into, even in disguise. And yet these parts 
had to be explored and mapped, if India was to be defended. An 
ingenious solution to this was soon found. Indian hillmen of ex-
ceptional intelligence and resource, specially trained in clandestine 
surveying techniques, were dispatched across the frontier disguised 
as Muslim holy men or Buddhist pilgrims. In this way, often at 
great risk to their lives, they secretly mapped thousands of square 
miles of previously unexplored terrain with remarkable accuracy. 
For their part, the Russians used Mongolian Buddhists to penetrate 
regions considered too dangerous for Europeans.2 
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The Great Game is a well-researched book with over 15 pages of bibliographic 
resources, including a number of biographies and autobiographies about 
and by intriguing Russians, Britons, and other relevant players of the time. 
Hopkirk has written several previous books concerning Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, and uses his experience as a subaltern in the King’s African Rifles 
and his extensive knowledge of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Far East 
to provide a vivid chronological account of the tangled individual motivations 
and strategic thinking behind the actions of Britain and Russia. Hopkirk tells 
the story of these many participants in the Great Game without character-
izing any of the individuals or countries involved as right or wrong, moral or 
immoral. The story is broad enough to be interesting, but avoids becoming 
vague or confusing. 
Hopkirk’s The Great Game is recommended for personnel involved with dip-
lomatic, military, or economic policy concerning Central Asia. In explaining 
the past, The Great Game also provides insight into the physical and cognitive 
environment of the region as it is today: 
If this narrative tells us nothing else, it at least shows not much 
has changed in the last hundred years. The storming of embassies 
by frenzied mobs, the murder of diplomats, and the dispatch of 
warships to the Persian Gulf—all these were only too familiar to 
our Victorian forebears. Indeed, the headlines of today are often 
indistinguishable from those of a century or more ago.3 
With that in mind, Hopkirk discusses how the Russians might have been 
better served had they paid attention to the failures of previous invaders, 
including Great Britain. The same logic applies to the United States, which 
chose not to pay attention to the lessons it might have learned, in turn, from 
the Russians. 
The Great Game officially ended around the time of World War I, which is 
where Hopkirk’s book ends as well. However, following the collapse of the 
Soviet empire, a new Great Game has emerged, with many players competing 
to fill the void left by Moscow’s official departure from Central Asia. Some of 
the new players, like Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and China, have been busy 
constructing mosques and Qur’anic schools, opening up consulates, and 
proffering large infrastructure projects such as roads and dams, in an attempt 
to solidify their position in the region. Original player Russia continues to 
put pressure on Central Asian and Caucasian countries to fall in line with 
Moscow’s policies. Wages from the 10 to 12 million immigrants who come to 
work in Russia are a huge economic boon for these workers’ home countries, 
counting for half of the national GDP in Tajikistan, for example. Russia often 
uses such strong-arm tactics as threatening to deport these workers whenever 
one of the Central Asian or Caucasian countries disagrees with a Russian 
initiative.
Then there is the new player, the United States. In recent years, Washington’s 
primary interest in Central Asia has revolved around how the region could 
support allied efforts against insurgents in Afghanistan. Central Asia’s stra-
tegic significance, however, potentially will grow in the face of the pending 
withdrawal of most foreign military forces from Afghanistan in 2014. Conse-
quently, experienced extremists will have increased freedom of maneuver to 
train, man, equip, and wage jihad against weak or failing regimes in Central 
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Asia. The departure of U.S. and allied military forces from Afghanistan there-
fore should not be viewed as the end of their involvement in Central Asia. 
The Western powers need to decide whether they will be silent spectators or 
influential players in the “New Great Game,” because the struggle for power 
and influence has already begun. v
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There is a distinction to be made between the WWII-WWII movie—
that is, a movie about World War II made during the war—and the postwar 
WWII movie.1 In the WWII-WWII movie, the characters in the film and the 
film’s contemporary audience were both in doubt as to the war’s outcome; in 
the postwar film, only the characters can be in doubt. The difference in feel 
between the two eras is palpable. The grittiest of the WWII-WWII movies, 
especially the early ones, convey a sense of rapidly expanding apocalypse. They 
are about individual and national survival. By the 1960s, one class of WWII 
movies had transformed the war from an event into a genre: purely fictional 
films like The Guns of Navarone (1961) narrowed the narrative possibilities to 
a set of action-adventure motifs. Another class, exemplified by films like The 
Longest Day (1962), offered re-creations of famous battles in which the fascina-
tion with historical detail offset the lack of suspense about the outcome.2  
A prime example of the WWII-WWII movie is So Proudly We Hail, which 
went into general release in September 1943.3 It has the further distinction of 
being a “woman’s picture,” which makes it a rarity among the typically male-
oriented war movies. Producer Mark Sandrich had made his name directing 
five of the Fred Astaire–Ginger Rogers dance-musicals of the 1930s. So Proudly 
We Hail shows him venturing into the action field while incorporating his ex-
pertise in romance. Despite the film’s appeal to women, Sandrich nevertheless 
didn’t shy away from the violent consequences of war; he even included mate-
rial that has a strangely prophetic relevance to today’s fight against terrorism. 
The film, inspired by the story of eight nurses evacuated from Corregidor 
Island in the Philippines to Melbourne, Australia, in April 1942, centers on 
the experiences of U.S. Army nurses during the Battle of the Philippines: the 
retreat from the Bataan Peninsula and the fall of Corregidor.4
Sandrich risked taking the time to produce a quality film, which bucked the 
prevailing wisdom on two counts. First was the assumption that a film could 
not be produced and exhibited as fast as the war was progressing; its subject, 
therefore, would no longer be topical by the time of the film’s release. The 
second notion insisted that large segments of the film audience were ambivalent 
toward war films because they read more than enough unsettling news in their 
daily papers and preferred the escapism of Westerns, musicals, and comedy. 
Sandrich hedged his bets by building romantic subplots into the script.
An additional distinction of the WWII-WWII movie, including So Proudly We 
Hail, was the infusion of propagandistic elements. These often came about 
through a combination of the screenwriters’ initiative in reflecting or shaping 
public sentiment and the suggestions offered by the Office of War Informa-
tion (OWI), a federal department created to influence the messages included in 
popular entertainment media such as movies, radio, and magazines. The OWI’s 
Bureau of Motion Pictures (BMP) opened a Hollywood office in June 1942, 
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inaugurating a cooperative venture between government 
and the film studios that avoided First Amendment and 
censorship issues. Sandrich submitted the first script of 
So Proudly We Hail to the BMP in October of that year, 
initiating a dialogue between BMP officials, Sandrich, 
and his screenwriters. BMP suggestions were woven into 
the final screenplay.5 
The film’s leads were the powerhouse trio of Claudette 
Colbert (Lt. Janet Davidson), Paulette Goddard (Lt. 
Joan O’Doul), and Veronica Lake (Lt. Olivia D’Arcy). 
Although all of the Army nurses shared the same rank, 
Davidson was the senior in charge. The story opens 
with a flashback to late November 1941. The nurses are 
shipped on a transport from San Francisco to Hawaii, 
but the attack on Pearl Harbor diverts them to the Phil-
ippines. As they see other ships in the convoy blown to 
smithereens by torpedoes, horror is visible on the faces of 
the witnesses. Throughout the film, the violent imagery 
is shocking, even by the jaded standards of modern 
cinema.6 The filmmakers repeatedly conjure a sense of 
imminent and extreme danger for their audience.
After being rescued from one of the destroyed ships, 
D’Arcy is brought under Davidson’s command. D’Arcy’s 
high order of coldness and bitchiness creates immediate 
consternation among her fellow nurses. Davidson bunks 
with D’Arcy because no one else will. On Christmas 
Day 1941, the ship’s chaplain delivers a speech on faith 
and the necessity of fighting to the death. Back in their 
cabin afterward, under Davidson’s pressure, D’Arcy 
finally breaks down and speaks her true thoughts: “I’m 
going to kill Japs, every bloodstained one I can get my 
hands on.” D’Arcy reveals that she was to be married 
that very Christmas Day, but that she had seen her fiancé 
gunned down on an airstrip during the Pearl Harbor at-
tack: “Sixty bullets … his face was gone … I couldn’t see 
him anymore. … They must be punished, and I’m going 
to punish them.” Two other nurses, attracted by the 
commotion, stand in the hatch, aghast. D’Arcy’s confes-
sion is as shocking as the torpedo attack. The inflamma-
tory language, the use of “Japs,” the lurid imagery, the 
high-pitched emotions—all are characteristic of these 
early WWII-WWII films. War films from the second half 
of the war, when the final outcome started to look like a 
foregone conclusion, tended to be tamer. The suffering 
remained, but the desperation melted away.
The nurses are ordered to Bataan. Idle time onboard the 
ship affords time for romance to bloom between nurses 
and soldiers. Davidson is courted by a Navy doctor. 
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When he attempts to kiss her for the first time, though, she backs away, de-
claring, “I can’t love you. We’ve got jobs to do.” It’s a message about the higher 
love that all Americans should be cherishing: love of country.
On Bataan, Davidson is introduced to Ling Chee, a Chinese guide. He wears 
glasses and is demonstrably intelligent and calm, a sharp contrast to the 
Japanese, who are consistently shown as bestial and immoral. Chee is there re-
ally only to remind the audience of the difference between the allied Chinese 
and the enemy Japanese. Later in the story, a Filipino surgeon demonstrates 
his courage by persevering through an operation while his wood-framed clinic 
takes a bomb from above, another message about the character of the Allies. 
More or less superfluous to the main plot, these are the kind of insertions 
routinely suggested by the BMP. Other plot points in the film deal with war 
shortages—the limited diet on the islands, nurses’ uniforms that don’t fit, 
and so on—reminding the home audience that they must make do in far less 
tough conditions without complaint. Unraveling all of these messages from 
the plot, and attributing their sources, is an intellectual treasure hunt.
Inside the nurses’ tent, away from Davidson’s ears, D’Arcy asks the head 
nurse: “Do you have any Japanese wounded? I’d like to handle them.” She 
lies about wanting to learn the language. It’s an ominous note; we imme-
diately understand that she’s contemplating murder. She is assigned to the 
appropriate ward, where she relieves an overworked nurse and is left alone 
with the patients. When Davidson hears what has happened, she runs there in 
panic: “D’Arcy with the Japanese wounded!” But she finds D’Arcy slumped 
in defeat: “It’s alright. I couldn’t do it. … I couldn’t kill even a wounded rat.” 
The message is that Americans, even in their lowest moments, are incapable of 
war crimes.
As the Japanese push southward toward the encampment, the nurses hear 
about the “bravery at the front,” which credits the Allied forces for fighting 
without assessing blame for the disastrous outcome. Retreat by the nurses 
becomes inevitable but is mistimed, leaving a group trapped while Japanese 
soldiers overrun the encampment. One nurse warns the others, “We’d better 
kill ourselves. I was in Nanking. I saw what happened to women there … I’ve 
seen ’em fight over a woman like dogs.” Unnoticed, D’Arcy stashes a grenade 
in her blouse. She addresses the group: “It’s one of us or all of us”; that is, 
it’s better that one should die than all should be raped. And, given the seeds 
sown by the plot, the one would have to be D’Arcy, whose grief and hatred 
are incurably deep. She wanders out of hiding and down the street, one arm 
raised over her head, the other in her blouse. She times her act perfectly. As 
a group of Japanese soldiers surrounds her—perhaps lulled by her femininity 
into dropping their guard—she disappears in a violent ball of flame, and the 
film quickly cuts to the next scene.
It’s a disturbing image, unquestionably a suicide bombing in the modern 
understanding of the term. Of course, acts of self-sacrifice are common in war 
films: a soldier charges a machine-gun bunker, is shot, and tosses a grenade 
through the horizontal slit before dying. But D’Arcy’s act seems qualitatively 
different. She is a woman, a noncombatant, and the ultimate efficacy of her 
act cannot be known—all traits that could be attributed to many modern-day 
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suicide bombers. Conventional suicide, it should be noted, is condemned 
under a broad consensus: it is illegal under the law, considered a betrayal of 
faith under the beliefs of religion, and seen as a cowardly act in society when 
used as an escape from personal problems. The term suicide bomber, with 
connotations of religious extremism and pointless terrorism, is thus a super 
pejorative. All of this raises the question of whether D’Arcy’s act provoked any 
moral outrage among viewers at the time. The film reviews of seven major city 
newspapers across the U.S. offered one way to gauge contemporary reactions. 
Given the moral and legal strictures, labeling the act a suicide would tend to 
undermine its sense of nobility, and in fact, only one review, in the Los Angeles 
Times, used the word: “… the suicide of a certain nurse [is] theatrically effec-
tive drama.”7 Indeed it is, and if it is effective as drama, absent of any contrary 
point, it must be laud-
able as behavior. In only 
one review was the scene 
pointedly character-
ized; Bosley Crowther’s 
plot summary in the 
New York Times said 
merely: “[D’Arcy] finally 
eliminates herself as a 
human bomb,” without 
further comment.8 The 
audience of 1943, with 
accounts of the actual 
events still fresh in their 
minds, accepted the 
extreme danger of the 
nurses’ predicament, the 
hopelessness of D’Arcy’s 
life, and the complete 
lack of redeeming merit 
in the enemy—a set-
ting in which a suicide 
bombing could be viewed 
as reasonable, or even 
noble. The current fight 
against terrorism gives 
the act fresh resonance.9
As a result of D’Arcy’s sacrifice, the nurses are able to evacuate to Baguio, 
in the mountains well north of Bataan.10 D’Arcy’s act remains a lesson in 
self-sacrifice, about doing everything in one’s power for the war effort. It’s a 
reminder to the audience that the true hardships are happening abroad.
Many of the incidents in the film were taken from news stories and melded 
into a single plot. The love lives of Davidson and D’Arcy appear to be derived 
from the experiences of one of the actual Bataan nurses, Juanita Redmond. 
She met her fiancé on a ship going from San Francisco to the Philippines in 
June 1940—that’s her contribution to Davidson’s character. The fiancé died 
in a fighter plane that was shot down during a Japanese raid on Port Darwin, 
Australia, on 19 February 1942—that’s D’Arcy’s trauma. The suicide appears 
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to be the creation of the screenwriters. Redmond returned to San Francisco in 
June 1942, and ultimately published a book about her experiences.11
Another incident “ripped from the headlines” is depicted in So Proudly We 
Hail as well. At one Bataan hospital base, personnel laid white sheets on the 
ground in the form of a cross in the hope that it would spare the facility from 
Japanese air bombings. On 10 April 1942, however, the base was attacked, 
wounding medical practitioners and soldiers in their hospital beds.12 In 
the film version, while the cross is being laid out, the nurses speculate as to 
whether it will spare them from attack—or make them a target. Echoing the 
news reports, the latter turns out to be the case, because they are “bombed 
without mercy.” The film, though, omits a key detail: following American 
protests, the Japanese High Command at Manila apologized for the attack, 
calling it unintentional. Regardless of the truth of their assertion, such nuance 
could have found no place in a film of the WWII-WWII era because it would 
have contradicted the uncompromising portrait of the enemy as a subhuman 
aggressor. The BMP, in its advisory role, tried unsuccessfully throughout the 
war to dampen racist characterizations of the Japanese. From the BMP’s point 
of view, the fight was not about white versus yellow but about ideology: de-
mocracy versus fascism. Fascism could be defeated, an interpretation that 
offered hope for a lasting peace.13
The final act of So Proudly We Hail covers the Americans’ evacuation to 
Corregidor, a widely covered news event, and the island’s eventual occupation 
by the Japanese. On the island, Davidson makes a surprising observation 
to the assembled nurses about why the war had sent them to places with 
foreign names that had become “American graveyards”: “It’s our own fault … 
because we believed we were the world, that the United States of America was 
the whole world.” It’s a rebuke of the isolationist policies that had delayed 
U.S. entry into World War II. She further explains that their role is to be a 
“delaying action,” to take heat while buying time for Allied forces to advance 
elsewhere. D’Arcy isn’t mentioned by name, but clearly her act of self-sacrifice 
has been expanded into a metaphor: the American suicide bomber thus 
becomes the symbol of heroism for the entire campaign.
The film was generally well received. The main complaint, from the predomi-
nantly male reviewers, was that the romantic subplots, seemingly plucked 
from the Hollywood screenwriter’s trick bag, detracted from the larger story 
of the war, even though, as is clear, these story lines were often adapted from 
actual news stories. The feature film will always focus on the experiences of 
individuals; the documentary plays by a different set of rules.
As to the film’s dramatic moments, if they are shocking now, then they must 
have been doubly so in 1943. Reviewer descriptions of the film bear this 
out: “a shattering impression of the tragedy of Bataan”; “death in its most 
terrifying aspects”; “grim, glorious, heroic and harrowing, a story that can be 
told only with sweat and blood and torment … sheer, heart-shaking tragedy”; 
“grim as war itself, [it] will leave you limp.”14
America fought its way from desperate straits to victory and postwar pros-
perity. Wartime agencies like the OWI were dismantled and forgotten. The 
BMP influenced the content of hundreds of films; the films remain, but many 
of the records are missing. Good times have a way of burying bad times. 
CTX | Vol. 4, No. 2
D’Arcy’s act of self-sacrifice 
has been expanded into a 
metaphor: the American 
suicide bomber thus becomes 




1 The ideas and opinions expressed by the author are his alone 
and do not represent the official positions of the U.S. Naval 
Postgraduate School, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. 
government, or any other official entity.
2 These generalizations about the nature of the WWII-WWII 
movie apply to Hollywood’s products, for practical reasons. The 
majority of the important Hollywood WWII-WWII movies, 
along with many British films of the era, are now available on 
DVD. Few foreign-language films of the era, in contrast, are 
available in the U.S. market; they appeal to a niche audience, 
and translated subtitles are an extra cost. Nations with vigorous 
cinema industries whose WWII films would be of particular 
interest include France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Japan. 
Based on a small sample, films from these industries contained 
propagandistic themes and messages and, like the British films of 
WWII, are worthy of separate consideration.
3 So Proudly We Hail (Paramount Pictures) was written by Allan 
Scott with uncredited contributions from First Lieutenant Eunice 
Hatchitt. It is worth noting that the script was written within 
months of the events it depicts, while the Japanese armed forces 
were still conquering Southeast Asia. The movie is available on 
DVD; see So Proudly We Hail, directed by Mark Sandrich, aired 9 
September 1943 (Universal City, CA: Universal Studios, 2007).
4 The Bataan Peninsula is the north arm enclosing Manila Bay on 
the Philippine island of Luzon. Corregidor Island lies 3–4 miles 
(5–6 km) from the tip of the peninsula in the mouth of Manila 
Bay.
5 Clayton R. Koppes and Gregory D. Black, Hollywood Goes to 
War: How Politics, Profits and Propaganda Shaped World War II 
Movies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). The 
establishment of the Office of War Information and the Bureau 
of Motion Pictures (BMP) in June 1942 is discussed on pp. 
58–59. For information specific to So Proudly We Hail, see pp. 
98–104.
6 One of So Proudly We Hail’s four Oscar nominations was for 
Special Effects. All six films nominated in this category in 1943 
were World War II movies. Paulette Goddard was nominated for 
Supporting Actress, Allan Scott for Writing (original screenplay), 
and Charles Lang for Cinematography (black-and-white). The 
film, however, was shut out on Oscar night.
7 Philip K. Scheuer, “So Proudly We Hail: Heroic Tale of Eight 
Army Nurses in Pacific War Zone,” Los Angeles Times, 3 
September 1943.
8 Bosley Crowther, “The Screen in Review: Misses Colbert, 
Goddard, Lake Seen in So Proudly We Hail as Army Nurses 
Who Aid the Wounded Men on Bataan,” New York Times, 10 
September 1943.
9 Koppes and Black, Hollywood Goes to War. While the authors 
examine the film and the exchanges between the BMP and the 
producers in detail, they describe D’Arcy’s sacrifice as routine for 
war films without further comment. It is worth noting that the 
book, which is a valuable resource for movie buffs, was published 
in 1987, long before the War on Terrorism came into being.
10 The film isn’t very detailed about its geography. Whether the 
nurses actually moved more than a hundred miles from south to 
north and then back south again is unclear.
11 Associated Press, “Eight Nurses of Bataan Back After Fleeing 
Japs,” Los Angeles Times, 13 June 1942. See also Juanita 
Redmond’s book, I Served on Bataan (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott Company, 1943).
12 Associated Press, “Bombs on Bataan Hit Hospital Cots,” New 
York Times, 12 April 1942.
13 Koppes and Black, in Hollywood Goes to War, discuss depictions 
of the Japanese in chapter IX, “The Beast in the Jungle,” pp. 
248–77. In contrast, the Caucasian European enemy was 
regarded as a Nazi problem rather than a German problem, 
leaving room for “good Germans”: honorable military men 
following orders and other reasonable people trapped by a harsh 
but temporary political system.
14 The quotations, in the order they appear, are from Crowther, 
“The Screen in Review”; W. Ward Marsh, review of So Proudly We 
Hail, Paramount Pictures, Cleveland Plain Dealer, 2 September 
1943; E.L., review of So Proudly We Hail, Paramount Pictures, 
Richmond Times Dispatch, 2 September 1943; and Pericles 
Alexander, review of So Proudly We Hail, Paramount Pictures, 
Dallas Morning News, 10 September 1943. 
Historians attempt to rescue the facts and meanings of the past, but films 
like So Proudly We Hail have great value in conveying elements that are often 
absent from written history, and are otherwise lost: the vivid moods and emo-
tions that were unique to their times. v
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Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Chapter of the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) to sponsor an an-
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and assassinations. Its tactics reflect a strategic decision made by its leadership to fight a guerrilla war, a familiar role for 
a group that thrived by waging an anti-Ethiopian insurgency in the mid-2000s.
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